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This is one of ten case studies that were part of an IIED research  programme on “Urban Poverty
Reduction Programmes: Lessons of Experience”. The research was undertaken with support from the
UK Government’s Department for International Development/DFID (project number R6859) and from
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The publications that are the result of this
work are listed at the end of this paper.
The ten case studies demonstrate the important roles that local institutions have (or can have) in
contributing to poverty reduction in urban areas. They show that:
•  many aspects of poverty need to be addressed, including not only inadequate livelihoods,
income levels and asset bases but also poor quality and often insecure housing, inadequate
infrastructure and services, inadequate legal protection of poorer groups’ rights, and
“voicelessness and powerlessness” within political systems and bureaucratic structures;
•  there are often positive multiplier linkages as actions to reduce one aspect of poverty can help
reduce other aspects;
•  there are many possible entry points for reducing poverty (including some for which little or no
external funding is needed) and many kinds of local organizations or institutions that can
contribute to this;
•  the form of the local institution that can reduce poverty varies with context; they can be
community organizations, federations of community organizations, local NGOs, local
foundations, municipal authorities or, on occasion, national government agencies or local
offices of international agencies;
•  one of the critical determinants of the success of poverty reduction initiatives is the quality of
the relationship between “the poor” and the organizations or agencies that have resources or
powers that can help address one or more of the deprivations that poorer groups suffer; and
•  sustained poverty reduction requires city and municipal government agencies and political
structures that are more effective, more accountable and more able to work with low-income
groups and their community organizations.
International agencies need to develop or expand funding channels to support local institutions that
can deliver for low-income or otherwise disadvantaged groups (including the organizations,
associations and federations formed by these groups as well as local NGOs and local government
agencies) while also remaining accountable to them. Such channels should also support the capacity
of these institutions to widen the scale and scope of poverty reduction programmes and recognize
that much poverty reduction depends on new attitudes and actions by local government institutions.2
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PREFACE
This report is one of a series of studies on urban poverty reduction programmes in
developing countries.  It was commissioned by the Human Settlements Programme of the
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in London, with funding from
the British government through its Department for International Development (DFID). Like
the other studies in the series, this report aims to document innovative approaches to
poverty reduction at the level of the locality, in this case the city of Cali in Colombia.
The information presented here was obtained through a combination of interviews, direct
observation and archival work using published and unpublished documents. Fieldwork was
done during July and August of 1998. This report and the field research that supported it
could not have been possible without the help of a few people who very generously provided
the author with their time, documentation and hospitality. I want to thank especially Dr
Rodrigo Guerrero, former head of Carvajal Foundation and former mayor of Cali, who gave
me much more time, contacts and hospitality than I ever dreamed of, all peppered with his
infectious humour. Warm thanks also go to Arturo Samper and  Isabela de Samper, from
whose hospitality, experience and private library I benefited. Dr David Satterthwaite, from
IIED, commissioned the study and made very useful comments on a first draft. Maria Zerdila
and Antonio Piñol helped with the graphics. Finally, and at the risk of leaving too many
people out, I want to thank all those who agreed to be interviewed and whose names are
listed in Appendix 2.6
SUMMARY
This paper discusses the role of local non-profit foundations in poverty reduction within Cali,
Colombia’s third largest city, and how they pioneered interventions on which the municipal
government could build after it had been strengthened by decentralization and democratic reforms.
Cali has long been a relatively prosperous city, although its economy has been much affected by the
economic downturn which started in the mid-1990s. By 1998, one-fifth of its economically active
population was unemployed and more than a quarter of households fell below the poverty line. Much
of the poverty is concentrated in particular areas, especially in Aguablanca (with one-fifth of the city’s
total population) and Siloe.
The city is unusual in having a long-established, large non-government sector, most of it funded by
local businesses. This sector has been active in social programmes since the 1960s and these have
reached a significant proportion of the city’s low-income households. The private foundations have
been particularly active in three areas:
1. Housing and settlement upgrading. In the early 1960s, the Catholic Church initiated community
action in the rapidly growing informal settlements, and the Carvajal Foundation (funded by the
printing house of the same name) provided funds to build, equip and manage ‘parish centres’ in these
settlements. The parish centres provided health care, primary and secondary schools, stores with basic
foodstuffs and household items, basic sports facilities and community meeting halls. By the late
1960s, they provided over 20 percent of the city’s health services. They were staffed by priests, nuns
and Foundation personnel but much of their costs were covered by fees charged. Over time, the
municipal government and other agencies have taken over the management of these centres.
During the 1980s, the Carvajal Foundation concentrated on supporting housing programmes,
community service centres and specialized services in micro-enterprise development in Aguablanca.
These helped bring down housing prices through support for self-help and construction materials
banks. The community service centres also concentrated a range of services such as telephones and
post offices.  Here, as in earlier initiatives, there was a concern that these become self-financing,
although managed by non-profit organizations. Many other foundations in Cali and in other cities
developed similar programmes, including Holguines Foundation which replicated the Carvajal self-
help support on a much larger scale, until it went bankrupt in 1998.
2. Social services and recreation. The Carvajal Foundation pioneered the provision of primary health
care to low-income populations although, over time, this was taken over by official institutions. FES
Foundation also supported primary health care programmes in Aguablanca and other poor settlements
in Cali (and in other cities), along with support for education.
Local foundations also helped to develop and fund Cali’s Corporation for Popular Recreation.
Originally set up by the mayor in 1978, this is a mixed enterprise, with 70 percent private and 30
percent public funds, which sets up and manages parks and recreational units. It has helped set up 43
parks and has also advised other municipalities. The core is a 15-hectare site built in the early 1980s
on land donated by the municipality and funded by the association of sugar-cane producers. A more
direct contribution to low-income groups is the 26 sports and recreational units in low-income areas.
3. Income generation, training and entrepreneurship. Since 1977, the two main programmes have
been support for micro-enterprises (which includes training, advice on business development and
access to credit) and the small shopkeeper programme (which includes training and access to the
Foundation’s wholesale stores). Between 1977 and 1996, 24,500 small-scale entrepreneurs were
trained and the Foundation served as intermediary for US$ 12.5million worth of loans.7
Positive aspects
Cali’s private foundations have a remarkable record of innovation, hard work and effectiveness in
providing the kinds of support and social services that an inflexible, underfunded state was incapable
of doing from the 1960s to the 1980s. They had considerable influence, through the political and
moral weight that they carried, in outlining directions and in setting social agendas which, since the
late 1980s, have been picked up by local and provincial government agencies. They demonstrated
how to provide schools and health care, support self-build and micro-enterprise development, and
develop recreational facilities in informal settlements where government agencies would not enter,
and did so on a scale that reached a significant proportion of all low-income households. They
developed models of service provision that minimized their dependence on continuing subsidies
through user fees, long before this became a policy pursued more widely in the interests of
‘sustainability’. They also contributed to changed attitudes – for instance, from the public perception
of micro-enterprises being backward to a recognition of their contribution to the city’s economy.
The experience highlights the advantages that private foundations have for innovation as, unlike
government agencies,  they are not burdened with high expectations, unwieldy bureaucracies and
cumbersome procedures.
Difficulties and limitations
The success of the private foundations is in part due to the fact that they are run by members of a
small, closed elite. Their social welfare programmes were dependent on the good will and
management capacity of private organizations with little or no public accountability – although, as
noted above, their policies also served as models which were subsequently adopted by municipal and
provincial authorities, who are accountable through elected governments (one former executive
director of the Carvajal Foundation was elected mayor).
The privately funded social welfare programmes also depended on the generosity and viability of the
businesses that funded them – and their vulnerability was demonstrated when one major foundation
had to suspend operations after the company that funded it went bankrupt.
The various programmes of the different foundations reached a very large section of the low-income
population but did not reach those with no stable income and of no fixed abode.
The foundations may have changed many people’s lives but they never sought to change the structural
conditions that generate and help perpetuate poverty.1
Urban Poverty Reduction Experiences in Cali, Colombia: Lessons from the Work of
Local Non-profit Organisations - Julio D Dávila
1. INTRODUCTION
Much of the work on poverty reduction is in the hands of central governments often
operating at the national level. It consists generally of a series of macro-economic and social
measures which seek to impact across a wide spectrum of regions and cities, often targeting
specific social groups who may be found in different regional contexts (UNDP, 2000). The
present series of studies aims to document and understand mechanisms used at the
municipal or city level to reduce poverty. In many instances, national governments are too
far removed from the realities of city populations to perceive and understand the
complexities of their realities and to act effectively upon them. A focus on local-level actions
also stems from a recognition of the significant changes in urban governance that have
taken place in many parts of the developing world, as a result of which, in many contexts,
local government has been placed at the centre of action, newly equipped with resources to
undertake functions previously in the hands of higher tiers of government.
The present report looks at the case of  Cali, Colombia’s third largest city.
1 The report
documents the unique role that non-profit  organisations have played in the past four
decades in attempting to reduce poverty in the city. A focus on non-profit  organisations
rather than on local government activities was preferred because of the remarkable
inventiveness that has been exhibited by private foundations in Cali in seeking to reduce
poverty and improve quality of life among low-income households. Some of the work of the
oldest and best known of these foundations,  Carvajal Foundation, has already been
documented in English (see Sanders, 1983a and b; Cruz, 1994). The intention of this report
is to place the work of this and other foundations in the wider canvas of Cali’s recent social,
political and economic development, as well as to examine it more closely from the point of
view of its effectiveness and the innovations it has brought about in the fight against urban
poverty.
The report comprises six sections. Following this introduction, Section two presents some
background information on Cali and its recent development. Section three examines recent
evidence on poverty and income distribution in both Colombia and  Cali. Section four
constitutes the core of the report, with an examination of the different areas of action in
which private foundations have been active in Cali in the past four decades. Section five
examines briefly the role of Cali’s local government in poverty reduction, as well as its links
with the private foundations. A final section provides a conclusion.
2. CALI: A BACKGROUND
Founded in 1536 in the fertile valley of the Cauca river in Western Colombia by the Spanish
conquistadors,  Cali was, until the twentieth century, a secondary provincial town in the
region of Cauca, which had been dominated by Popayán, a city founded also in the early
sixteenth century and located 140 kilometres south of Cali. Extensive agriculture has helped
underpin the economy of the Cauca valley, where ownership of land has traditionally been
highly concentrated in a few hands. This in part explains why, despite the wealth and
productivity of the soil surrounding it,  Cali would not flourish until well into the twentieth
century.
                                                                
1 Cali is officially called Santiago de Cali. The abbreviated (and more familiar) form is used throughout this report.
Whether Cali may be regarded as the second or third most populated city (after Medellin) depends on the precise
definition of the metropolitan area, a discussion which is not central to the arguments presented here.2
Cali would greatly benefit from its strategic location on the road and the railway line between
the cities of the interior in the Andean region and Buenaventura, the country’s second largest
port, located on the Pacific Ocean. In the early twentieth century, coffee, Colombia’s largest
single export for over a century, passed through Cali en route from the nearby region of
Caldas to  Buenaventura and onto the international markets. Following Colombia’s rapid
industrialisation in the 1930s, Cali also soon became a stop-over point for imports of raw
materials and intermediate and capital goods, disembarked in the port and taken to Bogotá
and Medellín, the busiest industrial centres.
With the advent of  industrialisation and the development of  agro-industry,  Cali again
experienced rapid rates of population and economic growth from the 1950s onwards.
Processing of sugar cane from nearby  latifundia and the location of branches of multi-
national companies in the 1950s and 1960s not only helped Cali become the third most
populated city but also rapidly helped turn it into the third largest manufacturing centre.
Colombia’s population grew from 11.5 million inhabitants in 1951 to 36.9 million in 1993. It
also urbanised very rapidly during this period, with the urban component of the national
population rising from 39 per cent to 73 per cent of the total, at an average of 4 per cent per
year during this period.
Rapid urbanisation took place in the context of a virtually uninterrupted rise in average
incomes, as shown in Table 1. The table shows GDP per capita figures at current US dollar
prices. When measured using purchasing power parity, Colombia’s GDP per capita was US$
5,749 in 1999, compared to US$ 8,297 in Mexico, US$ 12,277 in Argentina, US$ 15,712 in
South Korea and US$ 22,093 in the United Kingdom (UNDP, 2001). After decades of
uninterrupted growth, income in the 1990s and the first years of the twenty-first century
dropped due to the most severe economic recession to have hit Colombia in at least three
generations.
Table 1:
Colombia: GDP and GDP per capita, 1973-2000
Year
GDP
(millions of current
US dollars)
GDP per capita
(current US dollars)
Annual average
change in GDP per
capita
(%)
1973           10,286 450 –
1985 34,895 1,161 8.2
1993 55,829 1,556 3.7
1997        106,719 2,716 15.0
2000 82,419* 1,982 -11.0
* Provisional figure
Sources: For 1973-1993: GDP figures: DANE (1997); population figures: DANE, national population
censuses. For 1997 and 2000: ANIF (2001)
Average income figures mask a highly skewed distribution, however. In 1993, while the
poorest 20 per cent of the population earned 4 per cent of the national income, the richest
20 per cent earned 52.5 per cent (Londoño, 1996). This means that the richest quintile of the
population earned 13 times more than the poorest quintile. This compares with an average
ratio of 17 times in Chile in 1980-91, 13.6 in Mexico, 32.1 in Brazil and 6.8 in the United
Kingdom (UNDP, 1994).
When disaggregated according to occupation, average incomes show considerable variation
(see Table 2). In 1993, for example, an employer could on average expect to earn 2.6 times3
more than a wage earner, while a small landowner would get 2.9 times as much as a rural
worker.
Table 2:
Colombia: Average income by occupation, 1993
Occupation
Average income
(US$ per year)
Peasants 1,370
Rural workers 1,616
Self-employed 2,636
Wage earners 2,963
Landowners 4,721
Employers 7,561
TOTAL 2,781
Source: Londoño (1996)
Colombia’s pattern of urban development is often described as less skewed than in many
Latin American countries, where one large urban centre (usually the capital city) dominates
and weighs heavily on the national population (a phenomenon described by geographers as
“urban primacy”). Since the 1950s, Bogotá has been by far the largest city, followed from a
distance by Medellín. In 1951, Cali occupied fourth place in the hierarchy after the country’s
busiest port, Barranquilla, located on the Atlantic coast. By the mid-1960s, Cali had become
the third largest city, a position it retains to this day.
When measured in terms of population growth, in the second half of the twentieth century
Cali was one of the most dynamic of Colombia’s cities. During these decades, it not only
consolidated its position as the third largest urban agglomeration but, of the ten largest
urban centres, it also sustained a rate of population growth that was surpassed consistently
only by Bogotá (see Table 3).
As the city’s population has continued to age, the proportion of its inhabitants of  child-
bearing age has decreased, the city’s economy has reduced its capacity to absorb new
labour force and the city’s demographic growth has dropped. Thus, given the evidence that
in-migrants tend to be individuals of reproductive age, by the time today’s children reach a
reproductive age in around the year 2010, Cali will probably have a comparatively smaller
share of child-bearing groups than Colombia as a whole.4
Table 3:
Colombia: Growth of largest urban agglomerations, 1951-1993
(% per year)
Inter-census period
Urban agglomeration
a 1951-64 1964-73 1973-85 1985-93
1 Bogotá metropolitan area 6.7 6.0 3.5 5.1
2 Metropolitan Medellín 6.1 4.5 2.3 2.3
3 Metropolitan Cali 6.5 5.1 3.1 2.8
4 Metropolitan Barranquilla 4.5 4.1 3.1 2.0
5 Metropolitan Bucaramanga 5.1 4.5 3.1 3.6
6 Cartagena 5.7 3.5 5.1 2.0
7 Metropolitan Cúcuta 4.8 4.7 3.1 5.9
8 Metropolitan Pereira 4.4 3.5 3.2 2.9
b
9 Metropolitan Manizales 4.1 0.8 2.3 2.7
10 Ibagué 6.6 5.5 3.7 2.6
a.   With the exception of Bogota metropolitan area, wherever relevant figures refer to official metropolitan
areas. All data include the rural component of municipal population.
b.   Based on unadjusted 1993 figures.
Source: DANE, national population censuses
As has been the norm in rapidly  urbanising countries, internal migratory population
movements (in-migration) were a key contributor to  urbanisation in the period after the
Second World War. In-migration was the main contributor to demographic expansion in the
largest cities in the 1950s and 1960s, and a substantial part of this migration was rural in
origin.
Census figures show that the four largest cities were by far the most favoured destinations of
migrants between 1951 and 1973. In both 1964 and 1973, over half of Bogotá's population
had been born outside the city, a slightly higher percentage than in most other large cities
except Cali and  Villavicencio (the medium-sized capital city of the  Meta departamento, on
the Eastern plains) where over 55 per cent of all inhabitants were classified as in-migrants at
the time of the census (Flórez and González, 1983, page 66).
As in many Latin American cities, the high volumes of rural to urban migration (including the
higher shares of females) reflect economic and cultural factors. Social change and
widespread poverty in rural districts have compelled a disproportionate number of young
demand for unskilled women, notably in domestic service, but also in other services as well
as manufacturing. In Cali’s case, this is reflected in the ratio of male to female inhabitants,
which dropped from an estimated 92.8 males per 100 females in 1938 to 89 per 100 in 1985
(DANE, 1986, page 25).
Rural violence in the 1950s is also credited with accelerating in-migration into  Cali from
nearby rural areas and from other parts of the country affected by politically motivated
unrest. For violence, political and otherwise, has been a trademark of rural life in Colombia in
the past four decades. In the 1950s, and more recently in the 1990s although on a smaller
scale, this helped fuel out-migration from many regions.
2 Between July 1990 and June 1994,
for example, it is estimated that political violence (including presumed political killings, “social
                                                                
2 In recent years, refugees have usually been victims of the indiscriminate actions of the paramilitary and guerrilla
groups fleeing to the relative safety of large cities.5
cleansing”, disappearances and deaths in military action) claimed nearly 15,000 lives
(Colombia Bulletin, 1994).
Until the early part of the twentieth century, Cali was a small, compact town built around its
core, the Plaza Caicedo, located in the foothills of the western cordillera, one of Colombia’s
three large mountain chains running parallel to the Cauca river (see Map 1). Since the
1950s, Cali’s growth has been increasingly marked by a growing spatial division, with the
wealthier sectors of the population largely preferring the more central locations of the
foothills. These are favoured by an evening breeze and are more conveniently located closer
to the central business district, while poorer settlements have been increasingly expanding
towards the river to the east and up the mountainous areas to the west.
Cali developed an elongated form along a north-south axis, with a central area rapidly
increasing in density between the 1970s and the mid-1990s with the construction of high-rise
apartment and office buildings. The low-lying eastern sectors were also swiftly occupied
through land invasions and illegal sub-divisions as the pressure from in-migration mounted in
the 1960s and 1970s. The fact that these areas were often prone to flooding and were
relatively distant from the city centre made them more accessible to the poor who could not
afford more central locations. The most important of these settlements was the Distrito de
Aguablanca, which will be discussed later.
Table 4:
Cali: Area, population and territorial density, 1938-1993
Year
Area
(hectares)
Population
(thousands)
Annual growth
rate of
population (%)
Density
(population per
hectare)
1938 400 88 220
1951 1,290 284 9.0 220
1958 1,850 428 6.0 231
1964 9,100 638 6.3 70
1973 9,100 930 4.2 103
1978 9,100 1,100 3.4 121
1993 11,938 1,749 3.1 146
Source: For 1938-78: Mohan (1994); for 1993: DAP (1993)
Over time, the city of  Cali has developed along a semi-circular shape, expanding to the
south and east, away from the natural barrier of the western hills. Over the past 60 years,
the city authorities have regularly expanded the city’s official boundaries in order to keep up
with population growth.
3 Similarly, territorial population density (measured in crude terms as
the population divided by the area within the urban perimeter) has varied over time, in
response to successive changes in the urban perimeter by the city authorities (see Table 4).
Historically,  Cali has been slightly more compact than  Bogotá: densities in Colombia’s
capital city oscillated between 118 people per hectare in 1964 and 113 in 1978 (Mohan,
1994, pages 40-41). Both cities were more densely populated than  US cities such as
Chicago, Philadelphia and Detroit (with between 40 and 60 people per hectare) but less
dense than Bombay (140 people per hectare) (Mohan, 1994, pages 40-41).
                                                                
3 This involves expanding the “urban perimeter”, which defines the area to be served by public utilities and to be
developed following guidelines set by the municipal planning office.6
Table 5:
Structure of employment in Cali, 1973-1998
Sector 1973 1980 1984 1990/91 1997/98
Agriculture, fishery, mining 1.8 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.0
Manufacturing 25.9 27.4 25.0 24.4 21.6
Utilities 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6
Construction and public works 7.5 5.5 6.6 6.6 5.8
Commerce 19.9 26.4 25.6 26.8 26.6
Transport and communications 5.5 5.7 5.0 5.2 6.9
Finance and insurance 2.9 4.9 6.3 5.6 8.8
Community and personal services
a 27.6 27.8 28.9 29.4 28.4
Other
b 8.1 0.1 0 .0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a.  Includes personal and domestic services.
b.  Activities not clearly specified or information not available.
Sources: 1973-1984: DANE (1986); 1990-1998: Harris (1999)
As may be seen from Table 5, in Cali’s recent history over three-quarters of the labour force
have been employed in manufacturing, commerce, and community and personal services.
Since the mid-1970s, there have been changes in the distribution between sectors. The
more remarkable changes have been the relative drop in manufacturing, mining and
construction, while the share of finance and insurance trebled in the quarter of a century
covered by the table. The fall in the share of both construction and manufacturing in the
1990s and the parallel rise in transport and communications and financial services have
been a consequence of the rapid restructuring of the city economy, marked by de-
industrialisation and the recessive cycles of the construction industry, coupled with a general
trend towards increased tertiary activities common to many cities of this size (Harris, 1999).
This was, however, in a context of uninterrupted expansion in the number of total jobs in the
city of 18.6 per cent for the period 1990/91 to 1997/98.
Labour participation rates in Cali have also tended to rise as more workers have joined the
labour force (see Table 6). Such rises may be partly attributed to rapid increases in the
number of people of working age and to the increased incorporation of women into the
labour market as a result of changing social practices such as delaying the first pregnancy,
drops in fertility rates and a growing acceptance of female labour in formerly male-dominated
formal employment, especially services. From mid-1996 onwards, with the onset of
recession, rises reflected the attempt by some household members who would not normally
be employed (secondary earners) to seek work (even in the “informal sector”) as a way of
increasing household earnings (Urrea, 1997).
As Table 6 shows, with the exception of 1990, unemployment in Cali between 1976 and
1998 was higher than the average for the seven Colombian cities where regular household
surveys are conducted. In June 1998, Cali’s unemployment rate was also the highest among
the seven cities, with preliminary official statistics suggesting that this might have continued
to rise in subsequent years, as Cali entered the deepest recession in its recorded history.7
Table 6:
Cali and seven Colombian cities:
Labour participation rates and unemployment, 1976-2000
(%)
Cali
Year
a
Global
participation rate
b
Total
Unemployment
rate
c
Unemployment
rate in seven cities
d
1976             51.8 11.5 11.2
1985 59.3 14.4 14.1
1990 60.8 8.7 10.1
1995 58.0 11.1 8.1
1998 62.8
e 19.9 15.8
2000            66.0 21.5 20.4
na: not available.
a.    March of each year except 1998 and 2000, which refer to June.
b.    Economically active population/population of working age (defined in 1951 and 1964 as those aged 15-
59, and for all other years as those aged 12 or over).
c.    Unemployed/economically active population; refers to both women and men.
d.    Figures are based on household surveys conducted regularly since the 1970s in a group of seven cities
(which, after 1990, were not necessarily the largest): Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga,
Manizales and Pasto.
e.    September 1997.
Sources: For  Cali: 1976 and 1986: DANE (1986, page 57); 1990 and 1995: DAP (1996); 1998: El
Espectador (1998). For seven cities: 1976: Gómez et al. (1988); 1985: Gómez and Pérez (1992); 1995:
DANE (1998); 1998: El Espectador (1998); 2000: ANIF (2001)
Cali’s position in the national economy may also be gleaned from information on its tertiary
activities. Although the inhabitants of Bogotá are more spoilt for choice than other
Colombians when it comes to specialised retail and service outlets, in 1990 Cali had more
service sector establishments than its 5 per cent share of national population would suggest.
This was particularly true in the proportion of car dealers, finance outlets, estate agents and
establishments providing other services to the city’s and the region’s consumers and firms.
For example, Cali had 7.4 per cent of all car-dealing establishments in the country, 10.6 per
cent of all estate agents and 10 per cent of all establishments providing services to firms
(Gouëset, 1998).
Throughout the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, the city was affected by the ups
and downs associated with the illegal drug businesses that have made Colombia notorious
in the international arena. During this period, Cali was the base for one of two rival groups of
national importance involved in processing and distributing, initially cocaine and later heroin,
in the major consumer markets of the US and Europe. The activities of Cali’s “drug cartel”,
headed by brothers Rodriguez Orejuela, permeated key sectors of the city’s economy. An
unquantified although possibly substantial proportion of the cartel’s profits was invested in
the urban and rural property sectors, local manufacturing industries (such as
pharmaceuticals), agro-industry and retail activities (such as a chain of pharmacies with
outlets in other Colombian cities) and other money-laundering businesses. Although
members of the city’s traditional élite publicly shunned members of the Cali cartel, many no
doubt benefited directly or indirectly from the unprecedented volumes of hard currency that
flowed into the city in a short time span.8
The drug cartel suffered a serious setback and eventual collapse with the jailing in 1995 of
its leaders. Because of their illegal nature, it is difficult to measure the precise effects of their
activities on Cali’s economy. Colombia and some of its largest cities, including Cali, suffered
a severe recession in the second half of the 1990s. Several factors have been credited as
leading to it, including cyclical elements in the construction industry, the effects of
liberalisation and state reforms, and fiscal belt-tightening (Urrea, 1997), as well as a loss of
confidence by international investors in the context of continuing armed confrontation
between the armed forces, paramilitaries and rural guerrilla groups. Although difficult to
prove in the absence of reliable figures, in the specific case of Cali’s severe recession,
however, such factors were most probably compounded by the sudden interruption in the
flow of illegal drugs profits.
3. THE INCIDENCE OF POVERTY IN CALI
3.1 Income distribution and poverty in Colombia
Despite Colombia’s sustained rates of economic growth until the mid-1990s, poverty and an
unequal distribution of income have been two significant features in its development in the
past few decades. Another significant element in this period has been a shift in the incidence
of poverty from rural to urban areas, largely a result of the very rapid and disproportionate
growth in city populations compared to rural areas.
Table 7:
Income distribution in selected countries
Region/Country Year
Gini
coefficient
Share of
income of
poorest 10%
(%)
Share of
income of
richest 10%
(%)
Latin America
Brazil 1989 63.4 0.7 51.3
Colombia 1991 51.3 1.3 39.5
Mexico 1992 50.3 1.6 39.2
Venezuela 1990 53.8 1.4 42.7
Europe
Hungary 1993 27.0 4.0 22.6
Russia 1992 27.2 1.2 38.7
Africa and Middle East
South Africa 1993 58.4 1.4 47.3
Egypt 1991 32.0 3.9 26.7
Nigeria 1993 45.0 1.3 31.3
Asia
India 1992 33.8 3.7 28.4
Indonesia 1993 31.7 3.9 25.6
Thailand 1992 46.2 3.4 37.1
Source: DNP-UNDP (1998)9
Although there is no direct correlation between absolute poverty and an unequal distribution
of income,
4 a brief look at the issue of income distribution provides a useful background to
our understanding of anti-poverty policies in the case of Cali.
As Table 7 shows, Latin America has some of the more skewed distributions of income in
the world. Colombia has one of the highest indices, comparable to that of countries with
higher per capita income levels such as South Africa, Mexico and Venezuela. Brazil has
perhaps the highest concentration of income, with the richest tenth of its population earning
over half the total income. At the other extreme, some former socialist economies such as
Hungary and Poland (not shown in the table), as well as several Asian countries such as
India and Pakistan, have lower levels of concentration, with the poorest 10 per cent of the
population earning over 3 per cent of the income, and the richest decile earning less than
one-third.
The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 1998)
suggests that there was some redistribution of income in Colombia between 1979 and 1992,
particularly between the highest earners and some middle-income groups. The poorest
groups benefited only marginally from the redistribution. Of the other four countries included
in the ECLAC study, income tended to concentrate among the highest earners in Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico, while it remained relatively stable in Chile during the same period.
But while the quoted figures refer to national averages, research also shows that such
indices vary from one city to another as well as over time. In the case of Colombia, data from
household surveys focusing on income and expenditure show that some cities exhibit higher
concentrations of income than others (see Table 8). For example,  Medellín and  Bogotá
appear to have more skewed income distributions, while smaller cities such as
Bucaramanga and Neiva have less unequal distributions. There is some logic in this, in the
sense that the headquarters (and therefore the executives) of the largest corporations in the
country, including many multinational companies, as well as many smaller firms are located
in the two largest cities. They therefore have the highest paid executives and skilled labour
force in the country. Overall, in the years 1984/5 and 1994/5  Cali’s income was more
unequally distributed than Bogotá’s.
Table 8:
Gini coefficient for selected Colombian cities, 1984-1995
Gini Coefficient
Metropolitan
area/city
Population in
1993
(thousands)
1984/85 1994/95
Bogotá 6,700 0.48 0.51
Medellín 2,552 0.53 0.47
Cali 1,850 0.50 0.52
Barranquilla 1,348 0.44 0.43
Bucaramanga 804 0.43 0.42
Manizales 421 0.44 0.46
Montería 267 0.48 0.44
Neiva 248 0.40 0.44
13 cities -- 0.50 0.50
Sources: DNP (1998a) and DANE 1993 national population census
                                                                
4 In the case of Colombia between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, while poverty tended to fall, income inequality
tended to grow. This was accompanied by a concentration of poorer groups around a growing average income
(DNP, 1998a).10
Another interesting fact to emerge from the table is that in the ten-year period covered, there
is no clear trend towards either concentration or redistribution of income in the sample of
cities. Income tended to concentrate in Bogotá, Cali, Manizales and Neiva, while it tended to
remain stable or even to become somewhat less unequal in  Medellín, Bucaramanga and
Montería.
The measurement of poverty has been the object of much research and debate. There is no
agreement as to what indicators might more accurately describe poverty and which elements
of an individual’s life might be taken into account in such a measurement. There are, for
example, arguments for and against both quantitative and qualitative approaches to
measuring poverty; and such debates are not misplaced, as a particular definition and
approach to measuring poverty will heavily influence the design of policies and strategies to
reduce or eliminate it. Universal definitions are not valid and they will vary from one cultural,
geographical and economic context to another.
A discussion about the adequacy of different definitions of poverty is beyond the scope of
this report. In Colombia, as in many other countries, some of the initial efforts at measuring
poverty have been aimed at defining a poverty line, a yardstick (usually expressed in US
dollars) below which a household or an individual might be considered poor. In line with
international practices, the Colombian government has developed two poverty lines (DNP-
UNDP, 1998). The first one is referred to as the extreme poverty (or misery) line and refers
to the income needed to cover only the essential goods and services to survive. The second
one is the poverty line and refers to the income needed to buy a larger basket of goods and
services than one that assures mere survival.
5
Measured thus, in Colombia the incidence of poverty remained relatively stable between
1978 and 1995 (DNP-UNDP, 1998, page 141). Nationally, the share of the population below
the poverty line tended to drop slightly from 58.1 per cent in 1978 to a low of 53.2 per cent in
1994. In urban areas, the picture was similar, with shares dropping from 48.3 per cent in
1978 to a low of 42.5 per cent in both 1994 and 1995. In rural areas, by contrast, the
incidence of poverty dropped initially from 70.3 per cent in 1978 to 62.6 per cent in 1988 but
tended to rise again in subsequent years to reach 68.9 per cent in 1995.
The fact remains, however, that the incidence of rural poverty is higher than that of urban
poverty. Colombia’s rural areas contain nearly ten million people who may be classified as
poor, while its cities contain fewer than eight million poor. In 1995, for every 100 people
below the poverty line living in cities there were 167 in rural areas. And this despite the fact
that only three out of ten Colombians live in areas officially classified as rural.
Like income distribution, the incidence of poverty varies between cities as well as over time.
The figures in Table 9, based on household income and expenditure surveys, show a
measure of poverty for a selection of Colombian cities for 1984/5 and 1994/5.
There would not seem to be a correlation between size of city and incidence of poverty as
was the case with the Gini coefficient. In both years, the shares of poor people in Medellín
and Barranquilla are considerably higher than in Bogotá or Cali. Shifts in the incidence of
poverty appear, however, to be linked to the cities’ economic performance. The economies
of Medellín and Barranquilla were badly hit by a crisis in the textile industry in the late 1980s
and also by  liberalisation measures which, among other things, opened up the national
economy to consumer good imports in the early 1990s. Neiva’s growing population may be
explained also by the effects of a crisis in agriculture. The other cities in the table, by
                                                                
5 The extreme poverty line in Colombia was defined on the basis of an income and expenditure household survey
of 1984/85 in 13 cities. In the case of the rural population, this is based on a 1981 food and nutrition survey.  The
poverty line is calculated as twice the extreme poverty line in urban areas, whilst it is 1.5 times in rural areas
(DNP-UNDP, 1998).11
contrast, seemed to benefit from their relative strengths at a time when the performance of
the national economy was fluctuating but grew in net terms.
Table 9:
Poverty in selected Colombian cities and in rural areas, 1984-1995
Share of households below poverty line
(%)
City/area
Population in 1993
(thousands) 1984/85 1994/95
Bogotá 6,700 21.1 27.2
Medellín 2,552 33.4 37.4
Cali 1,850 28.9 25.2
Barranquilla 1,348 34.1 48.9
Bucaramanga 804 24.3 21.4
Manizales 421 41.3 25.5
Montería 267 42.8 27.2
Neiva 248 31.8 39.3
Rural areas -- 62.6
a 68.9
b
a.  1991
b.  1995
Sources: DNP (1998a) and DANE 1993 national population census
3.2 Income distribution in Cali
As in the rest of Colombia, Cali’s society is marked by social disparities. These are reflected
not merely in the differences in the income earned by its inhabitants but also in their choice
of residential area within the city, their use of social and recreational facilities and their
access to social services such as health and education. Fortunately for our analysis, much of
the recent social and economic information on Cali is available at the level of the comuna
(commune). These are the geographical and administrative units in which Colombia’s largest
cities are sub-divided. Throughout much of the 1990s, the municipality of  Cali proper
(excluding the neighbouring municipality of Yumbo with which it forms a metropolitan area)
comprised 20 comunas, though by late 1998 another one was added to reflect the city’s
spillover onto nearby farmland.
One form of inequality in  Cali’s society may be gleaned from the average earnings of
different occupations. Table 10 shows figures from one of a regular series of household
surveys conducted by the Colombian statistics office (DANE) in Cali and the neighbouring
municipality of Yumbo. Earnings for male employers were on average twice as high as those
for all male workers, whilst for women employers the differential was close to 70 per cent.
Earnings for domestic workers (who comprise around 5 per cent of the working population
and 95 per cent of whom are women) placed them at the bottom of the scale, with less than
half the average earnings for all female workers.  The lower average incomes for private
sector workers compared to government workers mask the larger size of the private
workforce and the greater diversity found among workers in the private sector, ranging from
highly skilled manufacturing or white collar workers in large firms to poorly paid workers in
non-unionised informal (non-recorded) workshops. The share of government employees
dropped from 8.1 in 1990/91 to 6.5 per cent of the working population as a result of
government restructuring (Harris, 1999),12
Yet another form of inequality is that between the earnings of men and women in the
working population. With the exception of unpaid family workers (whose remuneration in
cash is negligible) and domestic workers (an occupation dominated by women), men’s
earnings were considerably higher than women’s across all occupations. Differentials ranged
from a low of 17 per cent among private workers to a high of 76 per cent among employers.
The differential among male and female government workers reflects a disproportionate
concentration of female workers in low-paid administrative and maintenance jobs.
Table 10:
Average monthly income by sex and occupation
in Cali metropolitan area*, June 1994
(US dollars)**
Occupation
Men
(a)
Women
(b)
Differential
(a/b)
Unpaid family worker 3 8 0.29
Private worker/employee 408 349 1.17
Government worker/employee 668 545 1.23
Domestic worker 135 147 0.92
Self-employed worker 403 272 1.48
Employer 981 557 1.76
All working population 477 329 1.45
*  Includes Cali and Yumbo municipalities.
** Calculated to the nearest dollar using the “representative market exchange rate” of 819 pesos per US$1
on 30 June 1994.
Sources: Urrea (1997) Table 9; Banco de la República (1999)
Other variables help build a picture of inequality in Cali’s society. One of these is provided by
data on socioeconomic strata, a composite indicator developed by the Colombian
government to classify city  neighbourhoods according to individual housing conditions
(including quality of construction materials), availability of services to individual dwellings and
amenities available in the neighbourhood. Such indicators have been used, for example, to
set rates for utilities and have been instrumental in Colombian cities in supporting a policy of
cross-subsidisation of service costs from richer to poorer areas of cities
6. Although not
necessarily a reflection of inter-personal differences in income, the strata provide a picture of
spatial differences in living conditions.
Table 11 shows changes over a decade in the distribution of population in metropolitan Cali
according to the government’s six standard socioeconomic strata. The rapid rise in the share
of population in stratum one, the poorest of the six, is a reflection of the rapid influx of low-
income migrants to the city in the mid-1980s. By 1990, these had been largely absorbed,
while poorer areas of the city (including Yumbo, where a disproportionate share of low-
income migrants settle) benefited from improved services and better access to utilities. In the
1990s, the marginally increased share in this stratum reflected both a new wave of low-
income migrants and a process of relocation of newly arrived low-income migrants to areas
classified as stratum one.
Stratum three, which comprises largely a population of middle-income workers and salaried
employees, shows an impressive rise up to 1990, followed by a drop in the 1990s. However,
when only the population of Cali is considered and that of  Yumbo excluded, the rise is an
uninterrupted one, to a share of 41.5 per cent of all households (Urrea, 1997, page 129).
                                                                
6 Despite its obvious advantages in aiding the effective operation of basic services, an important drawback of the
system is that it reinforces spatial segregation along income lines while generating spatial inertia leading to large
areas being frozen in a given stratum for decades.13
This is because Yumbo’s disproportionate share of strata one and two areas tends to reduce
the proportion of population in all other strata. As Urrea has pointed out, the rapid rise in the
share of population living in stratum three shows the integration of a large working-class
population into urban life, “...perhaps Cali’s main social achievement” ( Urrea, 1997, page
130).
The growing share of the poorest stratum coupled with a shrinking of the two highest ones
suggests a somewhat improved distribution of income, particularly during the 1980s,
although, overall, with the onset of recession and the consequent increases in
unemployment, particularly among the unskilled and those with high school education, the
process appears to have been reversed during the second half of the 1990s (Santamaría,
1999).
Table 11:
Distribution of population by socioeconomic stratum
in Cali metropolitan area*, 1982-1994
(%)
Stratum** 1982 1986 1990 1994
1 11.3 19.9 16.7 18.6
2 35.1 26.6 25.9 29.4
3 34.8 37.2 41.6 37.4
4 6.3 8.1 8.7 8.4
5 11.1 7.2 6.4 5.4
6 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.8
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Population 1,353,445 1,530,368 1,725,085 1,905,111
* Includes Cali and Yumbo municipalities.
** Stratum one is the poorest and six the richest.
Source: Urrea (1997) Table 12A
Figures on coverage of health care and pension funds also provide an indication of
inequality in living conditions across Cali’s society. Despite legislation introduced in 1993
aimed at wide-ranging reforms in the social welfare system, such information has only been
made available in household surveys since 1996. The data for Cali presented in Table 12
also provide an indication of the severity of the recession affecting the city. In 1996, for
example, 52.6 per cent of Cali’s households regularly contributed to a health scheme (mostly
private) and 39.5 per cent to a pension fund. As household incomes fell and growing
numbers lost their jobs, the figures less than two years later were over two percentage
points lower.
The 1993 legislation made enrolment in these schemes compulsory for all those holding
formal sector, regular jobs; this increased the coverage of the social security network. While
in 1992, only 20 per cent of Colombia’s urban population was covered by (mostly
government-provided) health care, by 1996, 55.5 per cent of the population in the five largest
cities were enrolled in some scheme (Santamaría, 1999).
7
                                                                
7 In that sense, statistics about enrolment provide an indication of the extent of informality in the labour market.14
Table 12:
Cali: Coverage of health care and pension systems
by income quintiles, 1996 and 1998
(% of households in each quintile)
Sept. 1996 June 1998
Quintile Health
Pension
funds Health
Pension
funds
1 33.4 20.9 22.5 12.9
2 45.1 31.6 37.9 25.8
3 49.2 36.2 47.8 34.6
4 62.3 48.3 58.7 45.7
5 73.9 61.2 64.8 55.3
Total 52.6 39.5 49.2 37.9
Source: Santamaría (1999)
Table 12 also shows  that contributions to health care and pension funds are clearly
correlated to income level. In September 1996, enrolment in the health care system among
the poorest 75 per cent of households was below the average for the city and for the five
largest cities in the country. Figures were even lower for pension fund contributions.
Moreover, there is little doubt that the recession took its toll on welfare conditions in Cali. In
September 1996, more than one-fifth of the poorest 25 per cent of the city’s households
regularly contributed to a pension fund. By June 1998, this proportion had nearly halved,
while large drops were visible in the remaining four quintiles.
3.3 Poverty in Cali
Up to the mid-1990s, virtually uninterrupted economic growth coupled with the joint efforts of
the city’s population, the local government and other local institutions were instrumental in
dramatically reducing poverty levels among Cali’s inhabitants. The first half of the 1990s was
a period of expansion of the economy, with employment in sectors such as  commerce,
transport and financial services expanding at rates above the average for the city. By
contrast, construction, manufacturing industry and some services contracted in the period
1990-1998 (Harris, 1999).
Although the population in the metropolitan area continued to grow at a yearly rate of about
2.8 per cent, the number of people living in extreme poverty and in poverty dropped in
absolute terms by over 20 per cent in the period 1990-94 (see Table 13).
8 However, these
overall figures mask differences between areas of the city. Falls were concentrated in 12
comunas and in Yumbo, while a number of comunas showed rises both in their relative
share of poverty and misery and in the absolute number of poor and extreme poor. The
proportion of households living in extreme poverty in comunas 1, 5, 14 and 20 increased
significantly. Their joint share of households in extreme poverty rose from 21 per cent of the
metropolitan area to 34 per cent.
Thus, despite improved conditions overall, the figures show a worsening of the situation in
some areas of the city, particularly in these four comunas (see Maps 2 and 3). Comunas 1
and 20 are located in the foothills of the mountain chain that flanks the city to the west,
comuna 5 is located to the north-east of the central business district, while comuna 14 is the
                                                                
8 This is based on a different methodology for calculating poverty than that for Table 9.15
easternmost area and is one of three comunas which comprise the Aguablanca district. The
problems of this area are discussed in greater detail below.
Table 13:
Share of households below misery and poverty lines by comuna
in Cali metropolitan area*, 1990 and 1994
(% of all households)
Below misery line Below poverty line
Comuna 1990 1994 1990 1994
1 1.5 5.2 2.4 3.8
2 0.0 0.9 0.8 1.2
3 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.5
4 4.8 5.3 5.3 3.1
5 1.1 3.6 1.5 1.9
6 8.4 6.2 8.3 6.3
7 6.2 4.4 7.5 5.5
8 3.9 3.5 5.3 4.2
9 2.3 6.2 2.7 3.0
10 3.2 4.5 5.9 3.5
11 7.7 1.7 7.1 5.7
12 3.1 5.2 6.5 6.7
13 12.4 7.1 10.6 11.9
14 10.0 14.4 9.0 12.6
15 5.6 3.8 4.2 4.1
16 9.4 3.7 7.0 6.6
17 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.0
18 0.8 2.7 3.0 2.7
19 0.0 1.8 0.7 0.7
20 8.4 10.8 6.2 8.2
Yumbo municipality 8.2 6.3 5.3 5.1
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total number 23,968 20,141 137,739 108,804
* Includes Cali and Yumbo.
Source: Urrea (1997) Table 13
Urrea (1997) has shown that there is a link between poverty and migration in  Cali.
Furthermore, in a context where a significant proportion of the more recent migrants come
from areas along the Pacific coast and are African-Colombian, he argues that there is also a
link between poverty and skin colour.
Using information from a range of sources (though mostly household surveys), Urrea argues
that recent increases in poverty among the poorest strata of population in the  Cali
metropolitan area and in the poorest areas of the city may be at least partly traced to a rapid
influx of low-income migrants. These migrants come to Cali from poor regions and cities in
search of opportunities, but at least for a while remain spatially and socially segregated from
the rest of the city. In some cases, notably among black in-migrants, Urrea argues that they
are spatially, socially and culturally segregated by other Caleños.
9
                                                                
9 Cali’s inhabitants.16
Between 1986 and 1994, the incidence of misery (extreme poverty) and poverty was higher
among recent migrants than among the more established population (see Table 14). For
example, in 1984, over one-fifth of all households whose head had arrived in the city in the
previous year were classified as living in extreme poverty and nearly two-thirds in poverty.
By contrast, one in ten households headed by native-born persons lived in extreme poverty
and two-fifths in poverty.
Table 14:
Incidence of misery and poverty among Cali households according to
the migration status of the head of household, 1986-1994
(% of households in each category)
Length of time
spent by
household head
in Cali (years)
1986 1990 1994
Below
misery
line
Below
poverty
line
Below
misery
line
Below
poverty
line
Below
misery
line
Below
poverty
line
Under one year 21.6 65.6 24.9 57.1 19.2 50.0
1-3 16.1 50.8 12.6 46.7 5.7 39.1
4-5     17.3 52.3 10.7 45.2 5.6 47.3
6-10 14.1 51.8 5.9 38.5 4.4 27.5
11 and over 9.1 42.1 6.8 36.4 4.0 22.2
Total migrants 11.1 45.8 7.3 39.7 4.6 25.7
Native-born 11.5 39.5 5.4 38.8 5.4 26.7
Source: Urrea (1997) Table 17A
In line with improvements in social conditions during these years, the incidence of both
misery and poverty tended to fall within all groups between 1986 and 1994. But the drop in
levels of both misery and poverty tended to be faster among natives and long-term migrants
than among more recent arrivals. This suggests that newly arrived migrants are much poorer
than established migrants but the city offers them rapid opportunities to become assimilated
and improve their living conditions. The incidence of poverty among long-term migrants
tends to be lower than among the native-born. In fact, the absolute figures (not shown in the
table) show that the numbers of poor households with a native-born head increased from
31,368 in 1986 to 40,540 in 1990, and then dropped again to 33,684 in 1994 Urrea, 1997,
page 142).
The survey data for 1994 also show that the incidence of poverty and extreme poverty is
higher among female-headed households (see Figure 1). Although extreme poverty was
somewhat higher among the households of migrant women than among natives, and the
converse appeared to be true when poverty levels were considered, in fact there was no
significant difference between the two.17
Figure 1: 
Share of households below poverty and misery lines according to 
status of household head, 1994 (%)
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Source: Calculations based on Urrea (1997) Table 18B
3.4 A profile of Cali’s poorest comunas
A closer look at the nature and extent of poverty in some of the city’s poorer areas would
seem to offer a better understanding of the problem and lead to a more considered
examination of the possible effectiveness of programmes designed to reduce it.
As was said earlier,  Cali’s poorer areas are largely located on the periphery of the city,
mainly towards the west and east of the central business district. Perhaps because (as will
be shown later) its recent history involved illegal occupation of some land, and the growth of
political activism mainly by left-wing parties, the  Aguablanca district has received more
attention than other low-income areas. Aguablanca comprises comunas 13, 14 and 15. In
1995, according to the city’s Planning Department (DAP, 1996), these comunas had a joint
population estimated at 363,000, representing 20 per cent of the city’s total (not including
Yumbo, with which Cali forms a metropolitan area). As discussed earlier, the incidence of
poverty and extreme poverty in these  comunas is among the highest in the city, only
comparable to those of comuna 20, to the west of the city.
Comuna 20, known by locals as Siloé, is an older, denser settlement, most of it dating back
to the 1950s and populated largely by in-migrants from nearby provinces (mostly white or of
mixed race). Its population, estimated at some 62,000 in 1995, represents about 3 per cent
of the city total.
Social conditions in Aguablanca and Siloé were below Cali’s average (see Table 15). In both
census years 1985 and 1993, life expectancy, average family income and literacy rates were
all lower than in Cali as a whole. By the same token, infant mortality, average family size and
overcrowding were, with few exceptions, higher in these comunas.
Housing conditions (see Table 16) tended to be worse in the four poor comunas, particularly
with regard to access to basic services. Despite considerable improvements between 198518
and 1993, on average, living conditions seemed significantly worse there than for the
generality of Caleños.
Available data paint a composite picture of a less-educated population consisting of larger
families, whose members die younger than the average person in Cali, living in overcrowded
conditions in poorly serviced areas and earning less than the rest. At the same time, the
figures also show visible improvements in most of these conditions in the 12 years after
1985, particularly in terms of the availability of utilities, increased access to house-
ownership, and comparatively higher average incomes than a decade earlier against the
benchmark of the city’s average.
Figure 2: 
Homicide rates in Cali and in poor comunas, 1993-1996
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A final piece of information which should help us paint a picture of Cali’s poor comunas is
provided by the trends in the homicide rate in these comunas. Over the past decade or so,
Colombia has become internationally notorious for its high homicide rates. In the Colombian
context, Cali has some of the highest rates in the country and, within  Cali, some parts
exceed the already high city average. Homicides are the main cause of death in  Cali
(Alcaldía de Santiago de Cali, n.d.).
Although, nationally, the incidence of violence tends to be inversely correlated with poverty
(DNP, 1998b), it would appear that Cali is an exception in that sense. In terms of the number
of homicides between 1994 and 1996, comuna 20 was consistently above the city average
while the other three comunas remained close to the average, but still mostly above it (see
Figure 2).19
Table 15:
Basic social and economic statistics for Colombia, Cali and Cali’s poorest comunas, 1985 and 1993
Indicator 1985 1993
Colombia Cali
Comunas
Colombia Cali
Comunas
13 14 15 20 13 14 15 20
Life expectancy (years)      67.2 68.0 65.9 65.7 66.1 68.0 69.2 70.0 67.9 67.7 68.1 68.7
Infant mortality (per 1,000) 40.4 21.9 39.7 32.7 36.4 21.9      37.0 17.9 25.4 21.7 24.9 17.0
Literacy rate (% of those aged ten and over) 86.8 91.9 72.1 60.4 70.3 81.2 87.3 95.1 94.8 93.7 93.9 92.4
Average family size 6.1 5.2 5.1 4.7 4.5 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.4 5.2 4.6 4.8
Average family income (US$ per month) 130 155 76 69 82 76 261 336 227 227 227 227
Number of families per household 1.20 1.40 1.70 1.52 1.41 1.36 1.15 1.24 1.30 1.33 1.31 1.44
Source: Concha et al., (1997)20
Table 16:
Housing conditions in Colombia, Cali and Cali’s poorest comunas, 1985 and 1993
(%)
Indicator 1985 1993
Colombia Cali
Comunas
Colombia Cali
Comunas
13 14 15 20 13 14 15 20
Share of families living in:
Own dwelling      67.6 68.6 56.2 42.5 63.2 42.5 63.5 57.4 59.0 58.0 58.0 57.8
Rented dwelling 23.5 27.1 40.4 51.5 32.8 51.5 27.8 35.0 32.3 34.1 33.0 33.8
Other 8.8 4.3 3.4 6.0 4.0 6.0 na na na na na na
Share of population with access to:
Potable water 69.7 73.0 25.2 21.1 25.4 61.6 79.6 92.9 42.5 36.9 50.1 78.2
Sewage 59.2 64.4 27.8 10.9 24.3 72.0 68.6 82.6 40.6 27.1 41.9 91.4
Electricity (at least 12 hours per day) 78.2 85.3 39.7 30.4 52.6 65.4 80.5 90.2 56.1 55.3 86.4 85.7
Na: data not available.
Source: Concha et al., (1997)21
4. NON-GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES TO REDUCE POVERTY IN CALI
4.1 The non-profit sector in Cali
In many respects Cali is unique in Colombia in having a comparatively large non-
governmental sector which has been active in social welfare activities since the 1960s. That
it should have played an active and often crucial role in improving living conditions among
the city’s poorer groups, often complementing the role of a local state stretched to its limits
while setting an example for others to follow in Colombia and elsewhere, is a result of Cali’s
social structure and recent history.
It is surprising to think that less than a decade ago Colombia represented a political and
juridical environment where, officially, the state was the only social actor expected to actively
intervene in the development process, through such channels as infrastructure works,
regulation, investment, legal instruments and monetary controls. The initiatives of non-profit
actors such as NGOs and citizens’ groups, particularly if expressed outside the two
established political parties, were perceived often with suspicion and sometimes with hostility
from an establishment that saw in them the seeds of political subversion.
But decades of mounting social tensions from marginalised populations, of visible and daily
demonstrations of the state’s incapacity to provide the necessary infrastructure and services
to keep up with demographic growth and social change, and of constant reactions against a
highly centralised apparatus from distant populations, helped usher in much-needed
changes. Following a process of decentralisation and a strengthening of democratic
channels of representation in the 1980s and with the 1991 Political Constitution, the activities
of non-profit and community organisations as contractors to the local, regional or national
governments have become a matter of daily routine. They are also the harbingers of a new
institutional landscape, with the potential to help consolidate participatory democracy,
integrate a mass of excluded citizens and generate long-lasting improvements in quality of
life.
Yet in Cali, private foundations had already been playing an important role in filling the gaps
left by an inadequately equipped local government and by the, at times, even less
responsive local offices of central government institutions. Theirs is a story of an enlightened
group within the local élite who sought to confront the urgency created by rapid population
growth and the risk of social and political disintegration. The 1960s and 1970s were an
explosive time in a city marked by deep social disparities and a large influx of in-migrants
from the impoverished rural areas of the nearby provinces of Cauca and Nariño. In the
1960s, private foundations were, to a large extent, a self-preservation response from the
ruling élite to the real threats of a Cuban-style uprising and the political activism of left-wing
parties among the discontented and rapidly growing population of Siloé, Aguablanca and
several of Cali’s other poor districts.
Private foundations have, nonetheless, influenced Cali’s development and have been
instrumental in improving living conditions among its poorest citizens. Partly through their
initiatives and partly through their political and moral weight, they have helped outline
directions and a social agenda for the local government to follow. A number of medical
doctors from the élite, trained under the leadership of concerned professors, have been
influential agents of change and managers of many of the foundations’ initiatives. Some of
them have also made incursions into local political life, and have brought the ethos of the
foundations to local government programmes and agencies. Notable among them is Dr
Rodrigo Guerrero who, for a number of years, was head of Carvajal Foundation and was
elected mayor of Cali for the period 1992-1994.
Cali’s élite was very open to the influx of American ideas. Many of its members had studied
in US universities, often preferring these to the élite private universities in the capital city.22
The availability of an English-speaking managerial class, proximity to the sea port of
Buenaventura and the city’s location in a fertile and prosperous agricultural area all helped
the city attract multinational companies (mainly of US origin). By the 1960s, local managers
were eagerly consuming the latest American ideas about management, which they often
received directly from some of the thinkers of the time who were invited, all expenses paid,
by the local associations of producers.
One influential figure to visit the city was Peter Drucker, who stressed the social
responsibilities of an entrepreneurial class. Drucker’s ideas were instrumental in helping
shape the future actions of private companies such as Carvajal and in giving a new meaning
to the work of its foundation. This sense of “social responsibility” marked a whole generation
of Cali’s small élite of entrepreneurs since the 1960s. It helped provide a rationale for the
actions of their private foundations, initially “standing in” for a local government which lacked
the resources to undertake social programmes on a significant scale.
Unfortunately, the severe economic recession that has hit Cali since the second half of the
1990s has not spared the programmes of some private foundations. At least one major
foundation has had to cease operating because of a sudden change in fortune of the
company that funded it. This is no doubt worrying, as it gives rise to questions about the high
dependence of social welfare on the goodwill and management capacity of privately run
organisations with little or no public accountability. It may also put into question the wisdom
of making a by no means negligible component of the city’s social welfare programmes
dependent on the fortunes of enterprises which are so closely dependent on the city’s
economy.
There are three main areas where private foundations have been active in seeking to reduce
poverty in  Cali: housing and upgrading of low-income settlements, social services and
recreation, and income generation and  entrepreneurship. These have been backed by
education programmes and research and dissemination, both by non-profit organisations
and a few academic institutions, in particular the prestigious Universidad del Valle. As will be
shown in the following sections, programmes and projects in some of these areas date back
to the 1960s.
4.2 Housing and settlement upgrading
The first significant programme for improving living conditions among Cali’s poor dates back
to an initiative by the Catholic Church in the early 1960s.
10 The city’s rapid rate of population
growth in the 1950s and early 1960s (the third fastest among the country’s main cities),
fuelled largely by a rapid influx of in-migrants from nearby rural areas, was a matter of
serious and growing concern to the ruling élite. Migrants were attracted partly by a
combination of the rapid rates of growth of the city’s economy and the fast process of
agricultural mechanisation in the region which left many rural labourers jobless.
The political agitation that had helped ignite the Cuban revolution was all too present in the
form of growing unionisation of manufacturing workers, increased activity of left-wing parties
and growing political unrest, particularly in the newly created, fast-growing settlements in the
west (Siloé) and east of the city (what would in the 1970s become the Aguablanca district).
These were areas lacking almost totally in basic amenities. Farmland in Aguablanca was
subject to natural flooding from the waters of the nearby Cauca river and had been used for
rice cultivation. Siloé was subject to frequent landslides.
                                                                
10 The vast majority of Colombia’s inhabitants are nominally Catholic.23
Monsignor Alberto Uribe Urdaneta, then Cali’s Archbishop, set about creating parishes in the
new settlements. But this was no short-sighted act by a religious proselytiser. He wanted
parishes to help improve living conditions, particularly in terms of access to health, education
and recreation. He received the enthusiastic support of Manuel Carvajal, director of the firm
Carvajal & Cia. and creator of the Carvajal Foundation. For Mr Carvajal the problem was not
simply one of building the health centres but of administering them in the long run. The local
government lacked the necessary human and financial resources to do so, so it was left to
the voluntary sector to intervene.
Carvajal Foundation provided the funds to build, equip and manage five health centres
(known as “parish centres”) in different parts of the city between 1962 and 1967. They
provided a range of services, including a health centre, primary and secondary schools,
stores selling basic foods and household items at competitive prices, basic sport facilities
and a community meeting hall. In addition to a priest and nuns, parish centres were staffed
by Carvajal Foundation employees. Managers of the centres were often young medical
doctors, some of whom had trained under a cousin of Mr Carvajal’s, a medical doctor who
was also a founder of the Universidad del Valle in the 1940s. Although no revolutionaries,
the ideas of these young members of Cali’s élite were strongly inspired by Christian values
of social justice (Sanders, 1983a).
So important did the activities of the parish centres become that, by the late 1960s, they
provided over 20 per cent of the city’s health services. In the 1960s, Carvajal Foundation
had a staff of nearly 500, many of whom were medical doctors and nurses attached to the
centres. And although the Foundation paid for the administration of the health centres, by
the 1970s fees charged to patients covered some 80 per cent of their costs. Throughout this
period, Carvajal Foundation kept a low profile and wanted priests to be the visible leaders of
these centres.
In 1981, Carvajal Foundation decided to divest control of the parish centres to the Church
and to other institutions and to concentrate its activities exclusively in what was rapidly
becoming the largest and fastest growing concentration of low-income population, the
Aguablanca district. Most of the other poor settlements where the parish centres had been
set up were by now established communities with adequate services and utilities. Two of the
five centres no longer ran stores because supermarkets had appeared. Schools and health
centres were receiving support from the municipality. The centres had outlived their
usefulness, and each cost about US$ 400,000 a year to run and absorbed about 80 per cent
of the Foundation’s budget (Sanders, 1983a).
The unmet demand for affordable housing from a large and rapidly growing low-income
population was such that, in 1978, the municipal government was examining the possibility
of providing sanitation infrastructure to an area known as Charco Azul in what was then the
Aguablanca irrigation district, an area covering 3,000 hectares. News of the study leaked out
and part of the area was invaded by homeless families. The threat of further invasions led
the municipality, through INVICALI, its social housing agency, to offer plots of land although
with no services or basic infrastructure to some of the families.
In the four years between 1981 and 1985, the population of Aguablanca district grew from
28,000 inhabitants to 177,000. Growth came largely from low-income tenants living in other
parts of the city who saw in Aguablanca the very real possibility of owning a piece of land,
however distant it was from the city centre (Alvarez et al. 1990). In the eyes of the city’s
ruling élite, the threat of political subversion had returned there, with the militant presence of
left-wing groups such as M19, an active, articulate and well-organised urban guerrilla group.
Matters were initially made worse by the continued refusal of the local government’s
planning department to authorise a change of land use from rural to urban residential, thus
blocking the legal supply of basic infrastructure to the area, on the (correct) grounds that the
water table in the area was high and proximity to the Cauca river made it liable to flooding.24
Land in Aguablanca was owned by a few large landowners who preferred to sell it at a
premium to potential developers or to the municipality rather than run the risk of having it
squatted upon. Despite not being officially recognised as land suitable for urban
development, owners thus received a higher income for it and rid themselves of a potential
source of problems. Thus, for a few years many of the individual plots were supplied
(technically illegally since they lacked basic infrastructure) by INVICALI, sold by
unscrupulous private developers intent on making substantial financial gains, often with the
support of politicians, with the promise to buyers of supplying services in the near future, or
even squatted upon with the support of parties on the left (Mosquera, 1983). Through a
combination of a half-hearted action through INVICALI and total inaction by other
departments, the local government managed to deflate pressure over land in parts of the city
which were more desirable to middle and upper-income groups (Alvarez et al., 1990).
Carvajal Foundation made a conscious decision to concentrate efforts in Aguablanca’s
community centre and on its two main areas of concern, housing and micro-enterprise
development, and to experiment with projects which could be replicated elsewhere. In 1981,
the Foundation became a main player in the development of El Poblado I and El Vallado
housing projects, which brought together a number of public and private institutions. El
Poblado I was a 2,200 plot housing project on land supplied by INVICALI, but with little or no
support given to beneficiaries regarding credit or construction facilities. At the time of
launching the programme, there were some 17,000 people in El Poblado I, most living in
temporary accommodation on their new plots (Calderón, 1997). El Vallado was planned as a
4,000 plot housing project, but no plots had been allocated by the start of the programme.
Through its community centre, Carvajal Foundation was made responsible for the sale of
building materials and for community development. They teamed up with the government-
owned Central Mortgage Bank (BCH), the municipality, the National Apprenticeship Service
(SENA) and other agencies to provide households in the two settlements, with technical
assistance and credit to build houses on plots of land with basic services. Calderón (1997)
hails it as an innovative and unique case of effective collaboration by public agencies,
private entrepreneurs and users themselves, a model which served as inspiration for the
more ambitious Ciudadela DESEPAZ project launched under Mayor Guerrero’s
administration in the early 1990s (see below).
Beneficiaries in El Vallado were selected according to length of residence in Cali, number of
children, non-ownership of another dwelling and availability of savings for housing. Loans
were adapted to the households’ needs and ability to pay. Those households who had
access to the necessary skills chose to build through self-help, the cheapest alternative.
Most others either hired someone to help them, bought a prefabricated house or became
organised into co-ops to build a number of houses. But despite the impressive results
achieved in El Poblado I, the programme, like most subsequent housing programmes in
which the Foundation has been involved, excludes those who cannot show that they have a
regular income and a capacity to save. They are often the poorest of the city’s poor, who
often have no option but to resort to squatting on environmentally vulnerable areas such as
steep slopes or on the banks of the river. The municipality has a small programme of
relocation of some of these households, which is described briefly later.
By the time the project started, in El Poblado I, as with so many of these processes, a
substantial number of the houses were being built by their owners’ own hands, buying
materials piecemeal, usually a few bricks, cement bags and small amounts of sand at a time,
and then building parts of their house when time and money allowed. Construction materials
were bought from local shops, which would charge extortionate prices of between three and25
five times those charged by shops in the city centre, a few kilometres away.
11 The
Foundation provided initial help by acquiring a plot of land in El Poblado and, with funding
from BCH for the buildings, set up a “construction materials bank”. This model continues to
this day and consists of a number of small specialised outlets of large producers of
construction materials (bricks, cement, plumbing ducts, corrugated iron sheets, tiles,
bathroom equipment, and so on) selling at the same prices charged by outlets in the city
centre. The Foundation charges a 5 per cent administration fee on sales and also arranges
for local transport by horse-drawn cart or truck through small co-ops operating in the area.
The materials bank made an enormous difference to self-help builders. It involved much
persuading by the Foundation of the main suppliers or manufacturers of construction
materials who had the preconceived idea that poor, self-help builders were unable to pay for
their products and therefore did not represent a sizeable and stable consumer market. But
the Foundation’s Dr Guerrero and his team were able to show that they were wrong on both
accounts. People in El Poblado had both the wherewithal and the willingness to pay for
materials, while the large mass of small self-builders in the area represented a more stable
and predictable demand for materials, even in slack periods, than that coming from
speculative commercial developers elsewhere who were subject to the cyclical vagaries of
the construction market.
A more recent incursion into housing development by Carvajal Foundation is support to self-
help housing programmes. This has been done mainly through training and organisation of
large-scale projects on behalf of other institutions. Since its creation in 1984, the housing
programme has worked with households earning the equivalent of between one and two
minimum legal salaries. In doing so, they seek to fill a gap in the stock of housing offered
institutionally, as the volume of low-income dwellings sold by the municipality through its
housing department was very limited, while the units offered by family compensation funds
were aimed at households earning three to four minimum salaries.
12
The Colombian government currently provides a subsidy to every eligible household of about
US$ 3,000 towards payment of a dwelling costing no more than US$ 14,000
13. One way of
ensuring that the final price is held in check and that beneficiaries are in a position to repay
loans is to lower costs as much as possible through self-help construction.
Carvajal Foundation’s self-help housing programmes have succeeded in lowering
construction costs through effective training programmes and careful management. So much
so, that their model has been emulated by private foundations in Cali and elsewhere. Mr
Jairo Millán, who heads the Foundation’s housing programme, stresses that the major part
of their efforts is spent on organising potential beneficiaries before any stone is laid. “Self-
help builders are not made overnight”, he says. The Foundation provides technical
assistance and staff training to the funding agencies, mostly family compensation funds,
which are thus able to offer housing solutions to their affiliates.
Houses in a recent project in the Ciudadela DESEPAZ development,
14 funded by Comfandi
(a local family welfare fund) for its employees and affiliates, were built to fairly high
standards of construction and public services at a cost of US$ 6,700 each. Careful
organisation and training are crucial to the programme’s success.
                                                                
11 The price differential for many articles ranged between three times (for bricks) and five times (for bamboo,
used as casing for concrete floors and roofs).  The problem of hauling these goods from the city centre was made
worse by the poor state of the only road, which became virtually unusable in the rainy season (Calderón, 1997).
12 These are non-profit, private welfare institutions funded partially by mandatory subsidies provided by
employers and deductions from employees’ payrolls.  The 65 such funds in existence in 1996 had 3.2 million
affiliated members, while their various services covered more than 9.2 million beneficiaries (Villar, 1998).
13 At the exchange rate of 2,000 pesos per US dollar in September 1999.
14 This is the result of a large-scale, low-income housing programme initiated by the municipality under the
Guerrero administration. See section on local government and anti-poverty programmes.26
While training takes some three months of intensive preparation, the actual construction
process typically takes four weeks. Training is only partly designed to provide users with
technical construction skills. Much of the effort goes towards creating a positive community
spirit, ensuring that all users set aside the necessary time (or sufficient money to delegate
the work to someone else) to devote themselves entirely to the few weeks of intense
collective construction, and that they will administer carefully the US$ 3,000 in subsidy they
will receive. Much attention is paid to ensuring that every participant understands the
importance of working in collaboration with other users as a way of reducing costs and
maximising economies of scale.
The construction process is closely managed and monitored by engineers and architects
from the Foundation, with assistance from students at the university.
15 They not only provide
the technical expertise but must also become involved in matters of community organisation,
coping with the demands of individuals and even arbitrating in disputes that might arise.
They also ensure that building materials are supplied on time and in sufficient volumes so
that no time is wasted in the process.
The results of so much planning and community organisation clearly paid off in the Comfandi
project. As so much of the savings in costs arises from the scale economies and the
effective use of manual labour donated by people who often lack construction skills, users
were organised into teams covering about 20 plots. To avoid users putting more effort into
their individual house than into anyone else’s, they were all expected to work simultaneously
on all the plots, with individual allocation of plots done randomly at the end of the
construction process.
The built-up area of a finished house was 51 square metres but users could build additional
space up to a maximum of 107 square metres. They are provided with a plan of their core
house which shows clearly how, with expert help, it can be extended.
Notable among the foundations in Cali which have adapted this basic scheme to provide
housing to low-income groups is the Holguines Foundation, founded in 1993 by a large
construction company of the same name. Before the firm went bankrupt in 1998, bringing
down with it the Foundation, Holguines was active in building housing and other construction
projects in Cali and even in Bogotá. Holguines replicated the self-help housing scheme
developed by Carvajal Foundation but on a much larger scale. In the words of one of
Carvajal Foundation’s own staff members, Holguines were even more successful in terms of
the number of people covered and the speed at which they were provided with a dwelling.
As any systematic assessment of their differences lies beyond the scope of this study, one
might only speculate that this may well be due to Holguines’ considerably better knowledge
of the construction industry than Carvajal’s.
4.3 Community service centres
“Construction material banks” provided the seed for community service centres (CSCs).
CSCs rapidly replaced the old parish centres, thought to have reached the end of their useful
life. The same principles that governed construction material banks were applied to other
items such as basic foodstuffs, which were sold at the same prices found in the city centre
and therefore lower than those offered by local retailers. Although this generated some
hostility from local shopkeepers, it also helped keep in check their prices and generated a
healthy competition which benefited what was rapidly becoming a large local consumer
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market. Nonetheless, the policy of offering lower prices and the large volume of stock kept in
the centres means that, to this day, the three CSCs in Aguablanca are protected by high
fences and 24-hour security guards.
To the retail functions that were the trademark of the first CSC founded in El Poblado in
March 1982, soon other basic services were added. The Foundation invited some
government agencies to set up offices there. The telephone company responded positively
by opening an office offering local and long-distance calls. The city authorities also
authorised the opening of a notary public office and a post office. In the words of  Mr Diego
Peláez, the Foundation’s current director of the programme, CSCs became “development
poles” for the settlements where they were located. However, these are the only offices
offering these services to the population of nearly 400,000 in  Aguablanca district. In  Mr
Peláez’s view, the state has been reluctant to open other offices elsewhere, even in the
other two CSCs run by the Foundation in Aguablanca. In 1998, one of the new entrants into
the newly liberalised telecommunications market, partly Canadian-owned Nortel, showed an
interest in offering long-distance services in the other two  CSCs (located in the
neighbourhoods of El Vallado and La Casona).
The CSCs also provide other services. El Vallado, for example, has offices of the World’s
Women Bank, an international NGO which provides funds and technical assistance to
women entrepreneurs. It also has a community centre which provides holiday activities for
children, ranging from nursery care for the youngest to computer skills for everyone of a
suitable age.
In 1997, the three CSCs had joint sales of some US$ 17 million (or nearly US$ 100 for every
person in the economically active population of the district). Prices of household goods and
construction materials are typically 10 per cent lower than those of local retailers but an
important difference with the latter is that all items purchased in the CSC must be paid fully
and in cash; despite their slightly higher prices, local shops attract their clientele by offering
credit and instalment facilities. According to Mr. Peláez, an opinion poll in Aguablanca district
in the late 1990s showed that 73 per cent of adults in the district were aware of the services
offered by their local CSCs, suggesting that the district is well covered by their services and
that therefore no more can be built there.
Carvajal Foundation’s CSCs are a widely imitated pioneering experiment. According to Mr
Peláez, since 1986 private foundations active in other cities have sought Carvajal
Foundation’s advice on setting up similar centres in other parts of Colombia and elsewhere
in Latin America. CSCs have now been created in Guayaquil, Ecuador (“they are even better
than ours”, jokes Mr Peláez) and there is great interest in Venezuela, Peru, Nicaragua and
Panama, among others. Other foundations in Colombia have copied the model, but without
seeking Carvajal’s advice and sometimes even without acknowledging the source.
In the Foundation’s philosophy, that it seeks to transmit to other foundations who request
their advice, CSCs typically require financial and administrative support for a period of
between 12 and 18 months, by which time they should normally reach break-even point.
CSCs are not meant to be financially autonomous nor handed back to the local community
to administer. They are meant to make only the necessary profit to cover operating costs
and to reinvest in improving facilities.
The Foundation also discards the idea of handing CSCs over to the local government to
administer. This, in their view, might lead to a loss of trust in the centres by the
manufacturers or wholesalers who choose to sell their goods through them. This is because
the CSCs operate a system of concessions, whereby they administer the stock supplied by
producers and charge a small administration fee for this. In Mr Peláez’s view, private sector
firms would not feel comfortable leaving government officials in charge of their operation.28
CSCs are therefore meant to be administered by an agent from outside the community, who
is trusted by both sellers and consumers alike. When providing advice on the setting up of a
CSC, Carvajal Foundation requires that its management be entrusted to a non-profit
organisation, whose aims include support to social development programmes. In the
Colombian cities where the Foundation has provided support, they have required from
municipalities who request their financial support to the non-profit organisation until they
reach the break-even point, but then to withdraw this support and give them autonomy. But
financial support is nonetheless required from outside the community, as land and capital
investments can be high. For the first two of Aguablanca’s CSCs, for example, Carvajal
Foundation purchased the land but for the third one, the municipality leased the land to the
Foundation for a term of 20 years.
The range of services offered in a CSC does not follow a rigid format. They seek to respond
to the needs of the local community, as assessed partly through the results of market
research. To be financially viable, a CSC should cover a potential market of around 20,000
to 30,000 people.
CSCs are also meant to adapt in response to changes in the local community. For example,
as demand for construction materials falls once a substantial majority of the community’s
households have built a basic dwelling to fulfil their needs, the CSC may expand their offer
of services such as training, activities for youngsters during school vacations, advice and
credit to small-scale enterprises, and computer facilities.
In Cali, other private foundations set up CSCs in settlements where they were active.
Holguines Foundation created two CSCs to serve areas where they provided support to two
large-scale housing projects in Desepaz and in the adjacent Calimío settlement.
4.4 Social services and recreation
It was stressed earlier how health care for low-income groups was, for many years, at the
centre of activity of private foundations such as Carvajal. Medical doctors have played an
important role in guiding the work of several of the most important foundations, and the
provision of adequate health care, especially for the poor, still lies at the core of their work.
This dates back at least to 1958, when one of the founders of the Universidad del Valle
(Cali’s oldest and main university, run by the provincial government and created with private
sector support), Dr Velásquez Palau, helped set up a comprehensive improvement
programe in the village of Candelaria close to Cali. Health was at the centre of the
programme but it also included assistance in housing, sanitation and education. The design
of the health care programme in Candelaria, which involves increasing levels of complexity
from community health workers to regional hospitals, subsequently provided the foundation
for Colombia’s public health care system (Sanders, 1983a; Guerrero et al., 1990).
Health care remains an area of individual concern for some of Carvajal Foundation’s senior
staff who are themselves medical doctors. However, much of the thrust of health care
activity and research in  Cali now is in the hands of official institutions such as the
municipality, the Ministry of Health and the University. Before intervention by the national
government, due to mounting debts, the most significant support from private foundations in
the area of health came from Fundación FES.
16 This private foundation was set up by a
group of entrepreneurs in Cali in 1964 to support higher education. By the mid-1990s, FES
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had become one of the largest commercial finance corporations in the country, with US$ 50
million in assets in 1996 (FES, 1996).
Between 1986 and 1997, FES ran a primary health programme in  Aguablanca, which
involved the participation of the municipality’s health secretariat (then headed by Luis
Fernando Cruz who had worked in Carvajal Foundation and who would later become its
president), the University and other agencies. The programme would later be extended to
other low-income areas in Cali and eight other cities, at a total cost of US$ 1 million.
Another area where private foundations have left their mark in the city is recreation.
Foremost among these is the Corporation for Popular Recreation (CPR), created in 1978
under the initiative of the then mayor, Rodrigo  Navia Escobar. This was in response to an
opinion poll among Caleños about their perception of problems, where recreational facilities
came fifth after insecurity, unemployment, cost of living and housing-public services
(Sanders, 1983a; CPR, n.d.). Mr Navia Escobar, a business leader, delegated the task of
responding to this particular demand to other businessmen, led by Harold  Zangen who set
out to create the CPR, raising funds from private sources.
The CPR was created as a mixed enterprise, with 70 per cent coming from private funds and
30 per cent from public sources. In the period 1979-1997, the CPR invested US$ 24.1 million
in Cali, of which 10 per cent came from the municipal government, 4 per cent from the
provincial government, 67 per cent from the private sector, with CPR contributing the rest,
mainly from the proceeds of its sales. In 1997, CPR’s parks and “recreational units” received
an average of 686,000 visitors every month, a total of 8.2 million over the year (CPR, n.d.).
The CPR was designed to be run as a private enterprise, with profits being ploughed back
into its operations. The local government’s contribution is in kind, in the form of land leased
for limited periods to the CPR, and the costs of utilities (water, sanitation, electricity but not
telephone). In the words of its present director, Mrs Leonor Salazar Puyo, putting the CPR in
charge of its open spaces was a wise step for the municipality as it ensured they were
looked after properly, they were not invaded by the homeless nor used as rubbish dumps.
According to her,  Cali’s citizens did not view with suspicion the unusually high private
component of the programme because agreements with the municipality and the aims of the
CPR were well  publicised. For her, good marketing of a service of this  kind which, in
people’s perception should be managed by the state on a non-profit basis, is crucial to its
success.
The CPR has set up a number of parks and recreational units in different parts of Cali. Its
innovative nature and long experience means that its advisory services are much in demand
from other municipalities and provincial governments. In Valle province (of which Cali is the
capital), for example, the CPR helped set up 43 parks in as many municipalities, some with
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans.
The core of CPR activities is the Parque de la Caña (Sugar Cane Park), a 15-hectare site
three kilometres north-east of the city centre, built at a cost of US$ 1 million in the early
1980s. With land donated by the municipality and facilities funded mainly by the association
of sugar cane producers, for many years this was the largest amusement park in the
country. Its well-maintained facilities attract visitors from outside Cali and include, among
others, a lake, several swimming pools (including an “Aquapark”), party halls, five basketball
courts, five tennis courts and three soccer fields. An average of 120,000 people visited it
every month in 1997. Each paid an average entrance fee of US$ 2.60 (US$ 1 for those not
using the Aquapark), with children and large groups paying reduced fees.
But the CPR’s more direct contribution to the welfare of Cali’s lower-income inhabitants is to
be found in the neighbourhood parks. Its 26 recreational units are located in socioeconomic
strata one to three ( see Section 3 above). Monthly affiliation and entrance fees vary30
according to location. Users of El  Vallado recreational unit in  Aguablanca district, for
example, pay a monthly affiliation of about US$ 4 or an entrance fee of US$ 0.60 for adults
and US$ 0.40 for children. Although not high when compared with an average income of
some US$ 400 for a private or self-employed male worker (see Table 10), the fact that many
Aguablanca residents lack stable sources of income may explain why El Vallado unit has
only 35 users who pay a monthly affiliation, whose fees cover about 8 per cent of the running
costs of some US$ 3,000.
17 Like many of the smaller units in poorer districts, deficits are
regularly subsidised by profits generated by Parque de la Caña.
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The El Vallado unit was set up with a US$ 440,000 grant from the multi-national corporation
Colgate Palmolive and comprises a swimming pool, a meeting hall and some basic sports
facilities maintained to a high standard. The other main recreational unit in Aguablanca
district, in the  Desepaz settlement, was abandoned when its source of funding, the
Holguines Foundation, went bankrupt. The park was then donated to the municipality, which
does not have enough funds to equip it and run it. In the past, the municipality has often
sought to transfer neighbourhood parks to the CPR because they are believed to be in a
better financial position to run them. As in other areas of activity of private foundations, the
recession has affected the CPR’s work and this has had a negative impact on its capacity to
run more recreational units than it currently does.
4.5 Income generation, training and entrepreneurship
Another area where private foundations have left their mark in promoting social development
in Cali involves projects for income generation and training and other forms of support aimed
at strengthening entrepreneurship. Here again, Carvajal Foundation has been a pioneer in
its attempts to provide effective support to low-income groups, and in its constant search for
innovation and ways of replicating lessons elsewhere in Colombia and in Latin America.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Carvajal Foundation helped organise a number of cooperatives,
both to provide services to the local community and to help generate income for their
members. These included a number of cooperatives dealing with solid waste collection and
footwear production (Calzado Libertad). For a while, the heads of the co-ops were appointed
and paid by Carvajal Foundation. The co-ops collapsed in the early 1970s when  Carvajal
Foundation transferred control to their members. According to Dr Guerrero, the main reason
for their collapse was that co-op members did not believe that co-ops should be managed by
paid directors but, rather, by volunteers. This meant also that co-op heads would be drawn
from among the local population and that either they lacked the skills to adequately run the
co-ops or were not enticed to put in the requisite number of hours and effort to administer
them properly.
Since 1977, the Foundation has developed two main programmes of support to small
businesses, one aimed at “micro-entrepreneurs” and the other at local shopkeepers. They
are  a recognition of the importance of small-scale enterprises in the local and national
economies. It is estimated that in Colombia, there are 1.5 million small businesses, defined
as those with 10 or fewer workers and with assets valued at under US$ 33,000. They are
estimated to generate 26 per cent of all waged employment and 51 per cent of the country’s
                                                                
17 El Vallado neighbourhood (barrio) is located in comuna 15. In 1996, 77 of its 97 street blocks were classified
as stratum three. However, the majority of blocks in comuna 15 (360 out of 619) were classified as either stratum
one or two. Comuna 15 had a population estimated at 100,000 in 1996 (DAP, 1996).
18 Interview with manager of El Vallado recreational unit.31
jobs (ANFCDM, 1998). Moreover, the cost of generating an additional employment in a small
business is considerably lower than in a large firm.
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By the time the Foundation launched the DESAP programme of support to micro-enterprises
in the mid-1970s, little was known about the number, activities, requirements or future
prospects of small-scale entrepreneurs. Their existence was widely perceived as the
remnants of an unfinished process of modernisation, potential jobs that the “modern” sector
of the economy had failed to create, and a burden on the national economy. US-style
supermarkets and large factories producing modern gadgets were the accepted image of
modern development. Even the Foundation’s staff, who had visited an innovative
programme of support to micro-business in  Recife, Brazil, had difficulty  recognising
entrepreneurship in the family concerns that repaired radios, produced bricks or ran a small
corner shop in  Aguablanca. Somehow, the shops and workshops they saw seemed too
small and too familiar to merit the label of “entrepreneur”. And yet, the Foundation estimated
the number of small firms in Cali at around 10,000. Without these, tens of thousands of the
city’s low- and middle-income households, who did not own a car in which to shop at a
supermarket, would not have access to the food and basic necessities bought daily from
their corner shop, could not have their fridge repaired nor could buy affordable stoves, made
locally.
When they were approached by DESAP, most micro-entrepreneurs showed a keen interest
in the credit denied them by formal financial institutions because of what potential lenders
regarded as their lack of collateral to support a loan. Discussions with a number of small
entrepreneurs led Dr Jaime Carvajal to conclude that, more than credit, they lacked the
necessary expertise to run their businesses efficiently. DESAP set about providing them with
training and expert advice on how to run their firms better. The reasoning behind this was
that only once they understood how to run their businesses better would they be in a position
to gauge their real need for credit (Sanders, 1983b).
The challenge for DESAP then, was not only to gain acceptance among the firm owners but
also to train them at a pace and with a language with which they would feel comfortable.
Initially, standard business administration texts (often written for the US market) were used
but these soon proved unsuitable. Eventually, the Foundation developed its own manuals,
with illustrations and a language that reflect everyday reality in Cali’s poor districts.
20
Carvajal Foundation’s basic training courses for entrepreneurs run over seven weeks. Apart
from training, entrepreneurs receive between ten and 12 hours of tailor-made advice from a
business management expert on how to run their businesses. According to  María Emma
Jaramillo, head of the Business Development Unit, the programme must accommodate itself
to the requirements and constraints of the participants. Courses run in Aguablanca cater for
local entrepreneurs, mainly people from socioeconomic strata one and two. In its
headquarters, in the more  upmarket San Fernando District, the Foundation runs similar
courses for independent professionals and entrepreneurs from higher-income strata; they
are expected to pay for the full cost of training. Participants in  Aguablanca’s courses are
expected to pay for one-third of the total cost of the training and advice package costing US$
450, while one-third is paid for the national government and the remaining third is covered by
the Foundation. At the time of field research in 1998, half the participants in the training
courses were women.
                                                                
19 María Emma Jaramillo, head of Carvajal Foundation’s Business Development Unit, reckons that the cost of
creating one job in a micro-enterprise is about US$ 1,000 compared to up to US$ 5,000 in firms with 50 or more
workers.
20 The manuals are written in a simple language and illustrated with examples that someone with basic reading
skills can follow. The cartoons that illustrate the manuals, however, fail to take account of the fact that around
one-third of the population in Cali’s poorer districts is black (Velásquez, 1997). Women would not seem to feature
much either, when in fact many small businesses are owned and run by women, often heads of households who
thus maintain their families. Despite these problems, the manuals are widely regarded as good models for
practical training and have been translated and adapted in a number of countries, including Israel.32
Finally, should they require it, the Foundation can act as a bridge to financial institutions. The
first important source of finance for the programme came in 1979 from a US$ 500,000 soft
loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), repayable in Colombian pesos 20
years later. The IDB also made available up to US$ 5 million, to be lent through similar
schemes by the Foundation in other cities. Funds for the programme also came from the
Foundation for Higher Education (FES), which also disbursed the loans and collected
payments on them. The Foundation made a conscious decision not to  become involved in
any other way in disbursing or administering credits as this would detract it from its main
functions.
DESAP operated on the principle that a programme of this kind had to be self-sufficient and
credit was therefore not subsidised to borrowers. By the mid-1980s, DESAP was charging
an annual interest rate of 23 per cent, made up of 1 per cent interest for the IDB loan, 3 per
cent to FES for administration, 2 per cent as a reserve for bad debts, 12 per cent for part of
the cost of the advisory service and 5 per cent to increase the volume of the fund. The terms
of the loans were still fairly generous compared to other sources of commercial funding
(Sanders, 1983b). Sanders has argued that “...by developing its own loan programme and
channelling it through FES, DESAP solved two of the major problems in acquiring credit in
Colombia – red tape and time.” Sanders, 1983b, page 6).
By the late-1990s, loans to small businesses came mostly from indigenous sources and
were underwritten by a regional guarantee fund (CONFÉ) created by Carvajal Foundation in
association with the city, provincial and national governments, other private foundations and
the Cali Chamber of Commerce. This fund underwrites social development programmes in
the Cauca Valley up to 50 per cent of their value, and individual loans up to 75 per cent of
their value. Unlike IDB’s credit, loans from this fund are offered at commercial rates.
Apart from basic management training, the Foundation also provides more advanced and
specialised training for small entrepreneurs in areas such as marketing, sales and human
resource development. But it has perhaps achieved a greater impact among low-income
populations through its programme aimed at shopkeepers.
The shopkeeper training programme started in 1985 in Aguablanca district, at a time when
the M19 urban guerrilla group was very active in the area and mistrust against the authorities
ran very high. When the Foundation invited an initial group of 85 shopkeepers in Aguablanca
to attend the first meeting of its kind where their services were offered, only 15 turned up.
This reflected not only mistrust of outside organisations but possibly also fears that the
government might identify them and prosecute them for not complying with the minimum
legal requirements, including tax contributions. The induction and subsequent training of this
first group produced a snowball effect and soon many more were eager to join the training
programme.
The training programme arose out of a  realisation by Foundation staff that small
shopkeepers often got a raw deal from wholesale merchants, and that the prevalence of
poor management practices was leading many into debt and eventual closure.
21 The
programme involved training and credit provided by Coomicros, a cooperative funded with
capital supplied by the Foundation. Trained shopkeepers were also given access to
wholesale merchandise from the Foundation’s own wholesale store in the community service
centres. As most shopkeepers in Aguablanca have been trained, demand for the courses
has waned in recent years.
                                                                
21 Many shopkeepers failed to differentiate between the family and the business budget, thus taking liberally from
one source to cover expenses in the other without keeping track of the costs.  Most simply had no idea what their
income and expenses were, nor would they keep track of stocks.33
Between 1977 and 1996, the Foundation trained 24,500 small-scale entrepreneurs, most of
them in  Cali and its surrounding areas. Between 1987 and 1996, it served as an
intermediary in the disbursement of US$ 12.5 million to micro-businesses. In  Aguablanca
between 1986 and 1996, 3,750 shopkeepers were trained (representing around 90 per cent
of all of Aguablanca’s shopkeepers) and the value of disbursed loans was US$ 950,000
(Fundación Carvajal, 1996). The spread of similar programmes throughout the country has
led to an estimated 100,000 micro-entrepreneurs trained and more than US$ 30 million
made available in loans (Guerrero, 1995).
Colombia has come a long way from the time when small-scale enterprises were seen as a
burden on the economy, the remnant of a primitive state of affairs that had to be somehow
overcome. The government, academics, financial institutions and local officials have all long
recognised the contribution of shops, local services and small industries to development and
the generation of wealth and employment. The government has launched successive
versions of a national plan of support to micro-enterprises. Credit and training are no longer
the preserve of the lucky few. In all this,  Carvajal Foundation has made a substantial
contribution and its programme remains one of the most dynamic and respected in the
country.
At the same time as institutions such as Carvajal were making considerable efforts to help a
large number of micro-entrepreneurs, Cali’s society seemed to be turning a blind eye both to
their contribution to society and to the human tragedy of another group.  Many garbage
collectors who eked out a living working in the city’s rubbish tips and selling the material they
collected were being murdered by right-wing death squads who saw them as tainting Cali’s
image as a “clean and beautiful” city.
22 Like other individuals too poor to pay for a rented
room or who, for some reason, could not find a place in society and had to sleep rough and
sometimes beg in the streets, they were labelled the ”disposable ones” (thus making their
executions somehow appear a lesser crime).
Since 1986,  Fundación Social, a private sector foundation supported by a Jesuit-owned
financial services company, has been running a programme of support to informal sector
garbage collectors and recyclers. In their work in Navarro, a settlement close to Aguablanca,
the Foundation’s initial efforts focused on restoring dignity and self-esteem to individuals
who, in many respects, were considered even by themselves as marginal to society.
According to Fundación Social’s  Argemiro Parra, this group experiences higher levels of
violence than the rest of Cali society. The programme concentrated on creating  a sense of
community among the individuals of the group and on providing them with the means to offer
their services and negotiate with the municipally owned solid waste collection agency.
After eight years, progress was significant but remained limited in scale. A number of leaders
among the recyclers were sufficiently empowered to not only negotiate good terms with
Cali’s officialdom but also to participate in political events at a high level in the capital city,
Bogotá. But the plight of the 2,000 or so recyclers in Cali remains extremely difficult and
Fundación Social’s efforts seem only to scratch the surface of the problem. Garbage
collection and recycling is often an activity to which many turn temporarily during economic
downturns, while competition from cheap recycled materials imported from abroad (such as
paper from the US) is a new threat to their livelihood.
5. Poverty eradication, the local government and non-profit organisations
Private foundations have often worked hand in hand with local government. It was shown
earlier how, in the face of the incapacity or unwillingness of the local government to act, the
Catholic Church and the private sector started to actively intervene in seeking to alleviate
poverty. Official intervention on a large scale had to wait until the 1970s, when the
                                                                
22 This was the motto put forward to describe the city by the local administration at the time.34
municipality deployed its resources for infrastructure programmes in Aguablanca, the most
rapidly growing part of the city and what would become by far the largest concentration of
low-income inhabitants. In all this, it relied on support from the private sector, notably from
the private foundations.
As many of those interviewed for this report were at pains to point out, collaboration at the
highest levels of Cali society between the government, the private sector, foundations and
academia was made much easier by the fact that most of them were run by a closed élite of
Caleños who, for many years, have circulated among the highest posts (although
increasingly, high posts, especially elected ones, have been in the hands of individuals who
do not belong to the élite). In such an environment, it was easy to arrive at a consensus to
plan ahead and relatively easy to secure sufficient resources for long-term social and
infrastructure programmes.
It was in this context that the programmes of the private foundations listed earlier were
conceived and flourished. Their success owes much to a small and closed élite of liberal-
minded individuals who share a common vision about their role in Cali and the nature of
society, even in the face of opposition from less liberal members of the élite.
23 It is in this light
also that many of the programmes launched by the municipal governments must be seen.
And this is particularly so in the case of programmes of administrations of mayors who are
also leading members of the élite, like Escobar Navia, who was behind the creation of the
Corporation for Popular Recreation, and Dr Rodrigo Guerrero, who for many years headed
Carvajal Foundation and was elected mayor for the period June 1992-December 1994
24.
Dr Guerrero brought to the municipal administration lessons from the Foundation’s
experience and sought to replicate it on a larger scale mainly through the internationally
known DESEPAZ programme. Not surprisingly, this programme had a more marked
emphasis on social development and poverty eradication than those of his two immediate
predecessors in the mayor’s office ( Velásquez, 1997).
25  DESEPAZ (this stands for
Programme for Development, Security and Peace but, when read as one word, the Spanish
acronym means “let there be peace”) had at its core a housing programme to be built over
six years, designed to provide housing and amenities to 28,000 low-income households in
the Aguablanca District (Bonilla and Galeano, 1995).
The lessons from the two experiments in inter-agency coordination in the El Poblado I and El
Vallado formed the basis for the housing programme, with participation from the municipality,
the private sector and its foundations, and an active role for participants themselves, many
of whom were expected to self-build their homes through schemes such as those described
earlier. Community service centres and recreation facilities were to be given even greater
prominence than in the early years of Aguablanca’s growth.
Apart from the effects of the economic slowdown, the programme’s progress was slowed
down considerably by the rapid price rises for land in the area caused by speculators keen to
cash in on the large potential demand (Bonilla and Galeano, 1995), helped at least in part by
the alleged purchase of large tracts by drug bosses intent on laundering drug money.
                                                                
23 Arturo Samper, former deputy head of the municipal Planning Department, points out that broad-minded,
altruistic individuals are a minority within Cali’s élite.
24 They were also supported by the machinery of one of the two established parties, in contrast to less patrician
“civic leaders” (radio presenters or other public figures) who rallied support around specific issues of governance
that a substantial number of voters felt strongly about.
25 Municipal mayors were elected in Colombia for the first time in 1988, initially for two-year terms, later raised by
Congress to three years.35
Other important elements of the DESEPAZ programme (which have received international
attention by, among others, the World Bank) were institutional strengthening, the
development of programmes for vulnerable social groups, citizens’ education for democracy
and peace, police training with respect to human rights, sports events and research on the
causes of the high levels of violence through epidemiological approaches (Velásquez, 1997).
The administration was able to reduce violence considerably after it  realised that some
factors helped trigger it. Research showed, for example, that most homicides took place in
some of the poorest parts of the city, following drunken brawls on Sunday afternoons.
Weapons confiscation and bans on the sale of alcohol after certain times produced
immediate and significant results in helping reduce the incidence of homicides, from 2,239 in
1994 to 1,630 in 1997 (Rodrigo Guerrero, personal communication).
Figure 3:
Per capita municipal health expenditure, 1990-1996 (US$)
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Some of the effect of stressing social programmes may be gauged by the rise in per capita
health expenditure which started during the Guerrero administration (see Figure 3). Of the
poorest comunas discussed earlier, these effects appeared to be particularly evident in
Comuna 20, where average expenditures approximated those for the city as a whole.
Although Dr Guerrero’s programmes achieved prominence due to their innovative nature
and their social orientation, the accumulated track record of his predecessors in the social
development field is by no means negligible. As Table 17 shows, health service indicators in
the city improved considerably between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, particularly
services in low-income residential areas. The number of health posts in the city nearly
trebled, while access times to them were reduced in all the poorest comunas shown in the
table.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that any local government initiative or lack of action must be
seen in the context of the resources and autonomy they have at their disposal. Until major
decentralisation reforms started under President Betancur’s government (1982-1986) and
given decisive shape in Colombia’s new Political Constitution of 1991, local governments
had very limited scope for local action. Their interventions were virtually limited to physical
planning and public works. Their capacity to act in other areas such as education, health,
culture, policing, transport planning and housing were very limited. Even for cities the size of36
Cali, all of these and many others depended on central government. In what has been widely
regarded as one of the most effective processes of  decentralisation put in place in Latin
America, Colombia’s political reforms gave local governments not only a whole new range of
functions but also most of the resources to carry them through.
In that sense, Cali’s municipal government has become more active than ever before in the
1990s, and the initiatives of the city’s mayors (who were elected for the first time in 1988)
must then be gauged in terms of the effectiveness of their use of the increasing volume of
resources they received from transfers or from locally collected taxes and charges
throughout this decade.37
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Table 17:
Health services in Colombia, Cali and Cali’s poorest comunas, 1985 and 1993
(%)
1985 1993
Colombia Cali
Comunas
Colombia Cali
Comunas
13 14 15 20 13 14 15 20
Health posts
Number   2,282 28 3 1 3 2 na 71 9 5 4 4
Maximum access time on fot (mins.) – 20 15 30 15 20 15 10 15 10 10
Health centres
Number 668 22 1 0 1 1 na 28 1 2 1 1
Maximum access time on foot (mins.) – 30 15 – 15 20 na 15 20 20 20
Basic hospitals
Number     193 4 0 0 0 0 na 5 1 0 0 0
Maximum access time on foot (mins.) – 40 – – – – 20 20 – – –
Hospitals levels II and III
Number 753 4 0 0 0 0 na 6 0 0 0 0
Maximum access time by car (mins.) – – – – – – – – – – –
na: not available
–  : not applicable
Source: Concha et al., 199738
6. CONCLUSIONS: HOW EFFECTIVE HAVE NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS BEEN IN
REDUCING POVERTY IN CALI?
In many ways, Cali is like any other large Colombian or Latin American city today. What a
visitor sees is the result of a period of very high rates of population growth in recent
decades, the difficulties the local state has in providing the necessary infrastructure and the
institutional responses to accommodate a large influx of newcomers, and the stark contrast
between the elegant and leafy neighbourhoods on the Cali river and Aguablanca’s barren
landscape by the Cauca river. In the 1980s and 1990s, Cali had higher levels of income
inequality than most other large Colombian cities.
And yet, Cali’s economy has welcomed and accommodated vast numbers of in-migrants
from different parts of the country and, as Urrea’s research shows, has led to considerable
improvements in their living standards. Newcomers are on average poorer than the more
established inhabitants but, with few exceptions, they eventually become integrated, find
employment and settle down in a dwelling of their own. Despite higher levels of income
inequality, the incidence of poverty in Cali in the 1980s and 1990s was lower than in cities
such as Medellín and Barranquilla. In addition, the number of people living in absolute
poverty dropped both in absolute and relative terms in the same period.
When measured in terms of social indicators, access to social services and income levels,
Cali’s inhabitants made remarkable strides between the 1980s and mid-1990s. Vast new
areas of the city which had started life as socioeconomic stratum one were reclassified as
stratum three after a few years in what Urrea calls “perhaps Cali’s main social achievement”
(Urrea, 1997, page 130). The severe recession that ensued in the mid-1990s has made a
considerable dent in this record, with countless businesses closing down and unemployment
reaching record highs, among the highest in the country.
Like most other local governments in Colombia, Cali’s had little autonomy and limited
resources to cope with the sea change represented by the high rates of demographic and
physical growth of the 1960s and 1970s. Burdened by inflexible and inefficient institutions, a
planning office limited in its remit to land use zoning and the odd transport plan, and little in
the way of financial and human resources, the local government was in no way capable of
responding adequately to the challenge. In the closed and conservative world of Cali’s élite,
it fell to the Church and a few enlightened individuals to take action to help improve living
conditions among the rapidly growing poor, thus averting a social and political catastrophe. It
was the sense of urgency of the early 1960s and Cali’s peculiar notions of élite rule that
provided the spur for a new agent in Colombia’s urban development, namely the non-profit
private organisation.
Private foundations in Cali have left a remarkable record of innovation, hard work and
effectiveness in providing the support that an inflexible, under-developed, impecunious state
was incapable of providing. Starting with the doyen of these foundations, Carvajal
Foundation, but with the number and activities multiplying in the past four decades,
foundations have no doubt helped improve living conditions among Cali’s poorest
population, helped provide many of them with the tools to earn a living and build a dwelling,
and helped restore the dignity to many social outcasts who would otherwise be either dead
or living in precarious conditions on the streets.
It is very difficult to quantify the work of these foundations. No precise records exist for all the
foundations and even where these do exist, they do not allow a detailed examination of the
impact that their training programmes, their loans or their advice have had on beneficiaries.39
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The foundations’ work among low-income communities has focused on a few areas, such as
housing and settlement upgrading, recreation and social services, entrepreneurial training
and credit, and supply of basic consumer goods.
One might genuinely ask to what extent the foundations’ work, as described in the previous
pages, may be regarded as “charity” work as opposed to “development” work; to what extent
their work has consisted of hand-outs rather than tools that enable beneficiaries to change
the structural constraints that bind them to a vicious cycle of poverty. One may also ask to
what extent the foundations’ work has been focused on people who were not so poor or who
would have come out of poverty anyway even if they had not received any outside help,
rather than on the poorest and more marginal individuals in society (the “disposable ones”)
who, despite their smaller numbers, are in a much more desperate situation.
These are genuine questions, for which there are perhaps no hard answers. It is difficult to
generalise across all the foundations which have been active in Cali in recent decades. This
report has only reviewed the work of the most salient ones. Of these, it can be said that
although their initial work was no doubt inspired by notions of Christian charity and anxiety
about an explosive political situation, their later work in training, supporting and facilitating
housing construction and settlement upgrading went beyond mere handouts to locate itself
in the realm of empowering beneficiaries to take greater control of their own lives, improve
their living conditions and probably also enhance their chances of succeeding in a
competitive environment.
More importantly, the foundations’ work has shown to local government and other agents in
Cali society and beyond that there are effective ways of using scarce resources in low-
income areas. Unlike government agencies, foundations are not burdened with high
expectations, unwieldy bureaucracy and cumbersome procedures. Their experience builds
on modest but effective previous work and allows them to experiment with innovative
approaches. It is the enormous creativity that was unleashed in the process that remains the
main lesson to be learnt from Cali. It is a creativity that extends from the institutional set-up,
to the use of scarce resources, to inter-personal relationships. And these are the notions and
freshness that Mayor Guerrero and others learnt and brought to local government with some
measure of success.
However, despite remarkable achievements, it is perhaps fair to say that Cali’s private
foundation work has left out a small but by no means negligible part of its population, the
poorest of the poor, those with no stable income and often of no fixed abode. As the modest
in-roads made by the Fundación Social in its work with recyclers shows, this group remains
perhaps the more difficult to work with, and a distressing reality in Cali’s society.
The work of private foundations of the kind examined here says more about the nature of a
society like Colombia’s, with its vast social inequalities, than about human inventiveness. It is
to the credit of committed individuals in these foundations that they have helped improve
many people’s lives. But it is also true that their hard work was never intended to change the
nature of Colombian society in any deep sense, in the same way that it was not intended to
change prevailing structures of power, either in Cali or elsewhere. In that sense alone, their
work does not act upon the deeper structural problems of development. These were largely
top-down initiatives, initiated and developed by a group of well-meaning individuals, with little
or no consultation (let alone active participation) with the intended beneficiaries. Greater
involvement of the communities at whom these programmes were aimed in the different
stages of programme design, implementation and appraisal might have given these more
profound roots and given them more stability and greater independence from funding
sources which were severely weakened by a recession.
In the complex social and political juncture that Colombia faces at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, when the status quo is being violently challenged by forces on the right40
and left of the political spectrum, as well as the devastating effects of the narcotics business,
the private sector and the country’s traditional élite will need much more than innovative
approaches to short-term problems if a social catastrophe of higher proportions is to be
averted.41
41
APPENDIX 1: MAPS
Map 1: Municipality of Cali
Map 2: Extreme poverty in Cali by comunas, 1994
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